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I. INTRODUCTION 
On March 18, 1985, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit in Allied Bank International v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago 1 vacated 
an earlier decision that allowed a foreign state to defer unilaterally its external 
debt payments.2 This disposition rested on the court's construction and appli-
cation of the act of state doctrine and the principle of comity.3 The traditional 
expression of the act of state doctrine states that a U.S. court will not adjudicate 
claims involving the validity of a foreign state's public acts committed within its 
territory.' The principle of comity provides that a U.S. court should apply a 
foreign law where the United States and a foreign state have jurisdiction to 
prescribe the applicable law, but only if that foreign law is consistent with U.S. 
law and public policy.5 In Allied Bank the court of appeals held that neither the 
act of state doctrine nor the principle of comity supported giving extraterritorial 
effect to a Costa Rican unilateral payments moratorium.6 International financial 
institutions heralded this decision as restoring legal recourse for lenders against 
foreign borrowers which default on loan repayments because of governmental 
restrictions.7 Nevertheless, the Allied Bank decision presents a troubling prece-
1757 F.2d 516 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 30 (1985). 
2Id. at 523. 
'Id. at 521-23. 
4 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 401 (1964); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) FOREIGN 
RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 41-43 (1965). For a discussion of the act of state doctrine, 
see infra notes 34-48 and accompanying text. 
5 See, e.g., Clarkson Co., Ltd. v. Sheehan, 544 F.2d 624, 629 (2d Cir. 1976); Kenner Products Co. v. 
Societe Fonciere et Francerie Agache-WiIlot, 532 F. Supp. 478, 479 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Cornfe1d v. 
Investors Overseas Services, Ltd., 471 F. Supp. 1255, 1258-59 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), afJ'd, 614 F.2d 1286 
(2d Cir. 1979). For a discussion of the principle of comity, see infra text accompanying notes 49-60. 
6 Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 757 F.2d 516, 522 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. 
denied, 106 S. Ct. 30 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Allied Bank /II]. 
7 See The Wall St. J., March 19, 1985, at 4, col. I. Generally, a lender may exercise legal and 
contractual remedies against a borrower who fails to make payments or perform other obligations 
under a loan agreement. Events of non-payment or non·performance are usually detailed in a list of 
"events of default" contained in the loan agreement. See De1aume, Special Risk and Remedies of Inter-
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dent concerning the manner in which remedial measures undertaken by foreign 
governments in the context of the international debt crisisB should be treated 
under U.S. law. 
The Allied Bank case involved debts owed to a syndicate of U.S. and foreign 
banks by three banks that the Republic of Costa Rica wholly owned.9 The Costa 
Rican banks had issued promissory notes, accompanied by side letter agree-
ments, to the syndicate. lO The agreements did not specify a governing law,II 
national Sovereign Loans in DEFAULT AND RESCHEDULING: CORPORATE AND SOVEREIGN BORROWERS IN 
DIFFICULTY [hereinafter cited as DEFAULT AND RESCHEDULING] 89, 91 (D. Suratgar ed. 1984). The 
major event of default is failure by the borrower to pay principal and interest when due; other events 
include breaches of any representations or warranties made by the borrower, violation of any covenants, 
occurrence of default on other debt obligations, inability of the borrower to use resources of the 
International Monetary Fund, and "extraordinary situations". Id. at 92-100. Loan agreements may 
stipulate that imposition of a unilateral payments moratorium is an event of default. See Ryan, Defaults 
and Remedies under International Bank Loan Agreements with Foreign Sovereign Borrowers-A New York Lawyer's 
Perspective, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 89 (1982). Remedies available to a lender upon a default include: 
terminating the loan commitment and declaring due and payable all outstanding loans; bringing a 
court action for specific performance, a set-off against the borrower's assets, or a money judgment; 
or arbitrating the dispute. See Delaume, supra this note, at 97-100; Ryan, supra this note, at 89. A 
lender usually exercises one of these remedies only after less drastic measures fail, such as negotiating 
a rescheduling of the borrower's debt obligations. See Delaume, supra this note, at 97-98; Ryan, supra 
this note, at 105. See also Ryan, Defaults and Remedies in SOVEREIGN LENDING: MANAGING LEGAL RISK 
157-87 (M. Gruson & R. Reisner eds. 1984). 
8 The "international debt crisis" generally refers to debt servicing difficulties resulting from balance 
of payments problems in many developing countries. See IMF, OCCASIONAL PAPER No. 25, RECENT 
MULTILATERAL DEBT RESTRUCTURINGS WITH OFFICIAL AND BANK CREDITORS 1 (1983) [hereinafter cited 
as IMF (1983)]. The balance of payments refers to a measure of the transactions of a nation's economy 
with the rest of the world. The overall balance of payments equals the sum of the current account -
which measures trade in goods and services, including interest owed on debts, and transfer payments, 
such as gifts and grants - plus the capital account, which measures the purchase and sale of assets. 
See DORNBUSCH & FISCHER, MACROECONOMICS 627-28 (1981); MAYER, DUESENBERRY & ALIBER, MONEY, 
BANKING AND THE ECONOMY 687-91 (1981) [hereinafter cited as MAYER]. Developing nations' balance 
of payments problems have resulted primarily from inappropriate domestic economic management, 
adverse external developments including the world recession and soaring real interest rates in the 
early 19805, and spiralling growth of external debts to finance current account deficits. See generally 
BARTH & PELZMAN, INTERNATIONAL DEBT: CONFLICT AND RESOLUTION 1-10 (1984); CLINE, INTERNA-
TIONAL DEBT AND THE STABILITY OF THE WORLD ECONOMY 13-31 (1981); KOJM, THE PROBLEM OF 
INTERNATIONAL DEBT (1984); Goldstein, The Continuing World Debt Crisis, 3 INT'L TAX & Bus. LAW. 119 
(1985); Lipson, The International Organization of Third World Debt, 35 INT'L ORG. 603 (1981); Comment, 
On Third World Debt, 25 HARV. INT'L L. ]. 83, 83-98 (1984); de Larosiere, Adjustment Burden Is 
Manageable With Needed Finance and Recovery, IMF Survey, May 21, 1984, at 145, 145-46; Weisner, 
Domestic and External Causes of the Latin American Debt Crisis, FIN. & DEVEL., March 1985, at 24. For a 
comprehensive reference to other sources, see Internatiorwl Monetary Fund and Debt Crisis: A Selected 
Bibliography, 17 N.Y.U.]. INT'L L. & POL'y 751 (1985). 
9 Allied Bank III, 757 F.2d at 518. Allied Bank served as agent for the syndicate. /d. For discussions 
on loan syndications and the duties of agent banks, see generally Mudge, Sovereign Debt Restructure: A 
Perspective of Counsel to Agent Banks, Bank Advisory Groups and Servicing Banks, 23 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L 
L. 58 (1985); Clark & Farrar, Rights and Duties of Managing and Agent Banks in Syndicated Loans to 
Government Borrowers, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 229 (1982). 
iO Allied Bank III, 757 F.2d at 518 n.1. 
11 Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 733 F.2d 23, 24 (2d Cir. 1984) (available 
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but provided that the Costa Rican banks would make debt payments in New 
York City with United States currency and that New York and Costa Rica had 
concurrent jurisdiction over contractual disputes. 12 The agreements further 
listed the nonpayment of interest and principal within thirty days of the due 
date of payment as an event of default, but stipulated that the syndicate would 
excuse default for ten days if the failure to pay resulted from the refusal of the 
Central Bank of Costa Rica to provide U.S. currency to the debtor banks. 13 
The banks made payments on schedule until August 1981, at which time the 
Costa Rican government responded to severe economic problems by imposing 
controls on foreign exchange transactions. 14 The Central Bank, which decreed 
that it would authorize only repayments of external debts owed to multilateral 
agencies,15 thereafter denied the debtor banks' applications for U.S. currency.16 
Consequently, the banks defaulted, and the syndicate sued to enforce acceler-
ating full payment of the outstanding principal and interest. 17 
On July 8, 1983, a federal district court in Allied Bank I denied a motion for 
summary judgment submitted by Allied Bank, reasoning that the act of state 
doctrine would bar adjudicating the default action. IS On July 22, 1983, Allied 
Bank's action was dismissed upon an agreement with the Costa Rican banks 
that no issues of fact remained. 19 In September 1983, the government of Costa 
Rica and its Central Bank signed a refinancing agreement with international 
bank creditors restructuring its external debt. 20 Only one bank in the syndicate 
refused to accept the agreement,21 and on behalf of that bank Allied Bank 
on LEXIS, Genfed library, Cases file), rev'd, 757 F.2d 516 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 30 
(1985) [hereinafter cited as Allied Bank II]. Although this opinion is not contained in the bound Federal 
Reporter 2d, reference to it throughout this comment is necessary. 
12 Allied Bank II, 733 F.2d at 24. 
13 !d. 
14Id. 
15 Allied Bank III, 757 F.2d at 519. 
16Id. 
17 !d. The loan agreement listed the non-payment of interest and principal within thirty days of the 
due date of payment as an event of default, but stipulated that the syndicate would excuse default for 
ten days if the failure to pay resulted from the refusal of the Central Bank of Costa Rica to provide 
U.S. currency to the banks. Allied Bank II, 733 F.2d at 24. 
18 Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 566 F. Supp. 1440, 1444 (S.D.N.V. 1983), 
a/I'd on other grounds, 733 F.2d 23 (2d Cir. 1984), rev'd, 757 F.2d 516 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied 106 S. 
Ct. 30 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Allied Bank 1]. 
19 Allied Bank III, 757 F.2d at 519. 
20 Id. Restructuring agreements consist of either refinancing agreements and rescheduling agree-
ments or both. Refinancing refers to the provision of new funds equal to the payments due in a certain 
period. Rescheduling refers to the extension of an existing debt payment schedule over a longer 
period of time. See IMF (1983), supra note 8, at 17. 
21 Allied Bank III, 757 F.2d at 519. The non-consenting bank reportedly was owed approximately 
one-quarter of the debt covered by the loan agreements. Tigert, Allied Bank International: A United 
States Government Perspective, 17 N.V.U. J. INT'L. L. & POL'y 511, 516 (1985). 
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appealed to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. 22 On April 23, 1984, the court 
of appeals in Allied Bank II affirmed the dismissal on the ground that regardless 
of the act of state doctrine, the principle of comity required giving the Costa 
Rican foreign exchange controls extraterritorial effect.23 In vacating this judg-
ment, the court in Allied Bank III reversed both the district court's act of state 
analysis and its own comity analysis. 24 
Instead of clarifying the act of state doctrine and the principle of comity, 
however, the court of appeals muddled its construction and application and 
confused the treatment under U.S. law of foreign states' exchange controls.25 
These disturbing problems are manifest throughout the Allied Bank cases and 
in Libra Bank Ltd. v. Banco Nacional de Costa Rica,26 an earlier decision in which 
a federal district court also denied according extraterritorial effect to the Costa 
Rican foreign exchange controls. 27 The Allied Bank I, Allied Bank III, and Libra 
Bank courts each contorted the formulation of the act of state doctrine without 
regard to its purpose.28 Furthermore, the Allied Bank III and Libra Bank courts 
each undermined the principle of comity by exhibiting a biased predisposition 
against the Costa Rican exchange controls, despite their imposition to alleviate 
a national economic emergency.29 Most importantly, whereas the Libra Bank 
court left uncertain whether Article VIII, Section 2(b) of the Articles of Agree-
ment of the International Monetary Fund30 could mandate the extraterritorial 
22 Allied Bank Ill, 757 F.2d at 519. 
23 Allied Bank fl, 733 F.2d at 24. 
24 Allied Bank Ill, 757 F.2d at 518-19. 
25 The Allied Bank decisions have stirred several critical commentaries, undoubtedly with more yet 
to come. For a criticism of Allied Bank UI, see Note, The Resolution of Act of State Disputes Involving 
Indefinitely Situated Property, 25 VA. J. INT'L L. 901 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Note, Resolution of Act 
of State Disputes). For criticisms of Allied Bank ll, see Ebenroth & Teitz, Winning (or Losing) by Default: 
Act of State, Sovereign Immunity and Comity In International Business Transactions, 19 INT'L LAW. 225 (1985); 
Frumkin, The Act of State Doctrine and Foreign Sovereign Defaults on United States Bank Loans: A Neu Focus 
For A Muddled Doctrine, 133 V. PA. L. REV. 469 (1985); Zaizeff & Kunz, The Act of State Doctrine and the 
Allied Bank Case, 40 Bus. LAW. 449 (1985). 
26 570 F. Supp. 870 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). 
27 See id. at 875, 897. 
28 See infra notes 155-80 and accompanying text. 
29 See infra notes 211-29 and accompanying text. 
30 ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, December 27, 1945, 60 Stat. 
1401, T.I.A.S. No. 1501, 2 V.N.T.S. 39, amended by 20 V.S.T. 2775, T.I.A.S. No. 6748, 726 V.N.T.S. 
266 (May 31, 1968), amended by 29 V.S.T. 2203, T.I.A.S. No. 8937, V.N.T.S. (April 30, 1978) [here-
inafter cited as FUND AGREEMENT). For a statement of Article VIII, Section 2(b), see infra note 62 and 
accompanying text. 
Established as a result of the Bretton Woods Conference in 1945, the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) "seeks to promote monetary, financial, and economic stability in the world .... " IMF, OCCA-
SIONAL PAPER No. 26, THE FUND, COMMERCIAL BANKS, AND MEMBER COUNTRIES I (1984) [hereinafter 
cited as IMF (1984»). It provides rules for changes in exchange rate parities and for exchange controls 
affecting international payments, and, through membership quotas and special borrowing arrange-
ments, maintains a pool of national currencies from which members with balance of payments problems 
may obtain temporary financing. See MAYER, supra note 8, at 662. As of August 1984, its membership 
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enforcement of a foreign state's exchange control regulations,31 the Allied Bank 
III court altogether skirted determining the applicability of Article VIII, Section 
2(b), in the context of the act of state and comity issues on appeal.32 Thus, while 
the Allied Bank III decision ostensibly portends to reestablish certainty in inter-
national lending, its critical shortcomings underscore that it may only perpetuate 
the uncertainties associated with the prospect that a foreign nation may, through 
exchange controls or otherwise, impose a moratorium on external debt pay-
ments. 33 
This comment examines the complex problems exposed in Allied Bank III 
involving the interrelationships of the act of state doctrine, the principle of 
comity, and Article VIII, Section 2(b) of the Fund Agreement. After providing 
a brief overview of these defenses, this comment presents the courts' analyses 
in the Allied Bank cases and Libra Bank. It then critiques the Allied Bank III 
court's formulation and application of the act of state doctrine and the principle 
of comity, and proposes the manner in which the court should have construed 
Article VIII, Section 2(b). While this comment concludes that the act of state 
doctrine should not shield a foreign state's unilateral payments moratorium, it 
nonetheless cautions that despite Allied Bank III, Article VIII, Section 2(b) may 
includes 147 nations. IMF Survey, August 20, 1984, at 241. For discussions concerning the structure 
and operations of the IMF, see generally AINLEY, IMF: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE (1979); IMF, IMF 
PAMPHLET SERIES No. 37, THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND: ITS EVOLUTION, ORGANIZATION, AND 
ACTIVITIES (4th ed. 1984); Gold, Public International Law in the International Monetary System, 38 Sw. L. 
J. 799 (1984); Robichek, The International Monetary Fund: An Arbiter in the Debt Restructuring Process, 23 
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 143 (1984). 
31 See infra notes 103-06 and accompanying text. 
32 The debtor banks did not raise an independent Article VIII, Section 2(b) defense, but, in their 
comity defense, did cite the Article for the proposition that "the United States has specifically recog-
nized the legitimate needs of countries to regulate their national currency and impose severe restric-
tions upon currency exchange, even if in so doing private contracts are interfered with." Brief for 
Appellees at 28, Allied Bank International v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 757 F.2d 516 (2d 
Cir. 1985). As a general rule, a federal appellate court will not consider an issue not raised below, 
except where the proper resolution is beyond doubt or failure to consider the issue would result in 
an injustice. E.g., Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120-21 (1975); Schmidt v. Polish People's Republic, 
742 F.2d 67, 70 (2d Cir. 1984). Had Allied Bank raised the Article VIII, Section 2(b) issue, the court 
could have properly resolved it since failure to do so may have risked denying the extraterritorial 
effect of exchange controls that were legitimate under U.S. and international law. Yet even without 
having had the issue raised, the court should have considered the applicability of Article VIII, Section 
2(b), as a matter of law, in both its act of state and comity analyses, that is, as part of the issues actually 
raised. See infra notes 139-51,205-10, and 230-37 and accompanying text. 
33 More specifically, the decision exacerbates country risk. When making loans to foreign borrowers, 
banks assess both credit risk and country risk associated with a particular transaction. Credit risk is an 
assessment of the financial strength of a particular borrower. Country risk reflects the risk that a 
borrower will default because of a foreign government's inability or unwillingness to provide its entities 
or nationals with the foreign exchange needed to make external debt payments. See IMF (1984), supra 
note 30, at 7; Walter, Country Risk and International Bank Lending, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 71, 72 (1982). 
Lending to foreign governments involves only country risk, as credit risk is eliminated because a 
national government has the power to create money. See Walter, supra this note, at 72. 
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command the extraterritorial enforcement of certain payments moratoria ef-
fected through exchange controls approved by the IMF. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. The Act of State Doctrine 
Although originating as a corollary to the doctrine of sovereign immunity, 
the act of state doctrine emerged as a distinct principle, focusing on the im-
munity accorded to the acts of a foreign sovereign rather than to the foreign 
sovereign itself.34 In its early development, the act of state doctrine was con-
strued as preserving comity, or amicable relations, among nations by preventing 
U.S. courts from judging the validity of a foreign sovereign's acts.35 In Banco 
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 36 the U.S. Supreme Court shifted the focus of 
the act of state doctrine from comity to its "constitutional underpinnings" based 
on the separation of powers between the judicial and political branches of the 
federal government. 37 According to the Sabbatino Court, the act of state doctrine, 
which is strictly a matter of federallaw,38 derives from neither international law 
nor the Constitution, but manifests respect for the competency of the political 
branches in the conduct of foreign affairs.39 
Yet, throughout the development of the act of state doctrine, the U.S. Su-
preme Court has never explicated a clear test for determining its applicability.40 
34 See Note, The Act of State Doctrine: Antitrust Conspiracies To Induce Foreign Sovereign Acts, 10 N.V.U. 
J. !NT'L L. & POL'y 495, 497-98 (1978). See also Note, Rehabilitation and Exoneration of the Act of State 
Doctrine, 12 N.V.U. J. !NT'L L. & POL'y 599, 600-03 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Note, Rehabilitation]. 
35 See, e.g., Oetjen v. Central Leather Company, 246 U.S. 297 (1918); Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 
U.S. 250 (1897). In Detjen the U.S. Supreme Court explained: 
The principle that the conduct of one independent government cannot be successfully ques-
tioned in the courts of another ... rests at last upon the highest consideration of international 
comity and expediency. To permit the validity of the acts of one sovereign to be reexamined 
and perhaps condemned by courts of another would certainly imperil the amicable relations 
between governments and vex the peace of nations. 
Detjen, 246 U.S. at 303-04. 
36 376 U.S. 398 (1964). 
37 Id. at 423. 
38 Id. at 427. 
39Id. at 427-28. The U.S. Constitution contemplates that courts may have jurisdiction over claims 
involving fo.reign states. It provides: 
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, 
the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, under their Authority; ... to Controversies 
... between a State, or Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects. 
U.S. Const., Art. III § 2. 
40 Consequently, many commentators have considered what should be the proper method to apply 
the act of state doctrine. See, e.g., Mathias, Restructuring the Act of State Doctrine: A Blueprintfor Legislative 
Reform, 12 L. & POL'y INT'L Bus. 369 (1980); Comment, Applying an Amorphous Doctrine Wisely: The 
Viability to the Act of State Doctrine After the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 18 TEX. INT'L L. J. 547 
(1983) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Applying an Amorphous Doctrine]; Comment, Foreign Sovereign 
Immunity And The Act Of State: The Need For A Commercial Act Exception To The Commercial Act Exception, 
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The Sabbatino Court, seeking not to establish "an inflexible and all-encompassing 
rule",4' broadly stated that the doctrine's applicability depends on a "balance of 
considerations" sensitive to the effect of adjudication on the separation of 
powers.42 However, two later cases43 evince the lack of definitive guidance in 
Sabbatino, presenting three views of how to effectuate the policy which underlies 
the act of state doctrine: judicial abstention from claims which would result in 
the judicial branch's interference in U.S. foreign policy.44 The tests expressed 
in these decisions present a rule-oriented approach based on categorical excep-
tions to the general rule that the act of state doctrine precludes adjudication of 
any claim involving the acts of a foreign state;45 a balancing approach intended 
to prevent, strictly as a matter of prudence, a court's interference with the 
executive branch's conduct of foreign affairs;46 and a balancing approach de-
rived from the domestic political question doctrine.47 As a consequence of the 
17 U.S.F. L. REv. 763 (1983); Note, Judicial Balancing of Foreign Policy Considerations: Comity and Errors 
Under the Act of State Doctrine, 35 STAN. L. REV. 327 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Note, Judicial Balancing]. 
41 Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428. 
42 [d. 
43 Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976); First National City 
Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972). 
44 See infra notes 45-46 and accompanying text. 
45 In Dunhill, a plurality favored a commercial act exception. See Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 705-06. In City 
Bank, a plurality endorsed an exception whereby a court should defer to the executive branch's express 
representation that the act of state doctrine should not apply to a particular claim. See City Bank, 406 
U.S. at 768. For a discussion of the commercial act exception enunciated in Dunhill, see infra notes 
75-79 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the "Bernstein exception" supported in City Bank, 
see infra note 188. 
46 See Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 715 (1976) (Powell, J., 
concurring) ("it is the duty of the judiciary to decide for itself whether deference to the political 
branches of Government requires abstention"); First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 
406 U.S. 759, 776 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring) ("the basic notion of the act of state doctrine ... 
requires a balancing of the roles of the judiciary and the political branches"). 
47 See Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 727 (1976) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting) ("the act of state doctrine reflects the notion that the validity of an act of a foreign sovereign 
is, under some circumstances, a 'political question' not cognizable in our courts"); First National City 
Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 787-88 (1972) (Brennan,J., dissenting) ("the validity 
of a foreign act of state in certain circumstances is a 'political question' not cognizable in our courts"). 
As expressed in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962), justiciability of claims involving political 
questions depends on a balancing of factors comprised of a 
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political de-
partment; ... a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; ... 
the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for 
nonjudicial discretion; ... the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution 
without expressing lack of respect due to coordinate branches of the government; ... an 
unusual need for unquestioning adherence to political decision already made; [and] the 
potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on 
one question. 
See also Northrup Corp. v. McDonnel Douglas Corp., 705 F.2d 1030, 1046 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 
104 S. Ct. 156 (1983) (referring to the act of state doctrine as the "foreign counterpart of the political 
question"). 
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failure to provide a clear test, the lower courts have displayed a lack of uni-
formity in defining when the act of state doctrine should apply.48 
B. The Principle of Comity 
The principle of comity refers not to a rule of law, but to a matter of "practice, 
convenience, and expediency"49 by which a U.S. court may give effect in the 
United States to a foreign state's acts that are consistent with the "policy and 
law of the United States".50 Comity entails more than simple courtesy and 
goodwill, but does not impose an absolute obligation on U.S. courts.51 Rather, 
comity involves a "due regard both to international duty and convenience" and 
to the rights of persons protected by U.S. laws.52 It is consistent with the 
principle that under international law, in the absence of an agreement, the 
effect of a nation's law is limited to the nation's territory53 and, accordingly, that 
the effect of a foreign state's acts in the United States depends on voluntary 
recognition of those acts by U.S. courts. 54 
Although courts have often considered the principle of comity as a component 
in the act of state analysis relating to claims involving property located outside 
the acting foreign state,55 the principle of comity serves an independent func-
tion.56 The act of state doctrine derives from the notion of a separation of 
powers among the branches of the federal government in the conduct of foreign 
affairs.57 Even though the act of state doctrine cautions against the adjudication 
of claims that could disrupt international comity in the sense of amicable rela-
tions among nations,58 the principle of comity is a misnomer for a conflicts of 
laws rule which allows a forum state to disregard foreign laws repugnant to its 
48 For a discussion of the waivering between rule-oriented and balancing approaches in the lower 
courts, see Comment, Applying an Amorphous Doctrine, supra note 40, at 558-70. 
49 Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 440 (3rd Cir. 1971), cen. 
denied, 405 U.S. 10 17 (1972). 
50 Republic of Iraq v. First Nat'l City Bank, 353 F.2d 47, 51 (2d Cir. 1965), cen. denied, 382 U.S. 
1027 (1966). See also United Bank Ltd. v. Cosmic Int'l Corp., 542 F.2d 868, 872 (2d Cir. 1976). 
51 See, e.g., Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 409; Somportex, 453 F.2d at 440; Pilkington Brothers P.L.C. v. AFG 
Industries Inc., 581 F. Supp. 1039, 1043 (D. Del. 1984). 
52 Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895). See also Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian 
World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 948 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Somportex, 453 F.2d at 440. 
53 Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163 (1895). 
54 Id. at 202-03. See also Zaitzeff & Kunz, supra note 25 at 450. 
55 See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chemical Bank New York, 658 F.2d 903, 908 (2d Cir. 1981); 
Bandes v. Harlow & Jones, Inc., 570 F. Supp. 955, 960 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Libra Bank, 570 F. Supp. at 
877-88. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 43 (1965). 
56 Recent cases recognize this important distinction. See Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc. v. A. 
W. Galdari, 777 F.2d 877, 881 (2d Cir. 1985); Allied Bank III, 757 F.2d at 520-22. 
57 See Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 423. Confusion between the act of state doctrine and choice of law 
principles nevertheless is evident in Allied Bank III. See infra notes 154-56 and accompanying text. 
58 See Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428, 430-33. 
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own laws and public policy. 59 The principle of comity, which might be better 
understood as the doctrine of public policy in an international setting, promotes 
comity in the sense of goodwill only insomuch as it may permit a U.S. court to 
apply laws of a foreign nation, avoiding an unnecessary, albeit justifiable, de-
rogation of the foreign state's authority.60 
C. Article VIII, Section 2(b) of the Fund Agreement 
Article VIII, Section 2(b) of the Fund Agreement generally provides for the 
extraterritorial enforcement of an IMF member's exchange control regulations, 
but its scope and effect has sparked more controversy among courts and com-
mentators than has any other Fund Agreement provision.61 It states: 
Exchange contracts which involve the currency of any member and 
which are contrary to the exchange control regulations of that mem-
ber maintained or imposed consistently with this Agreement shall 
be unenforceable in the territories of any member.62 
As interpreted by the IMF, this provision operates to deny parties whose ex-
change contracts violate legitimate exchange controls "assistance of the judicial 
or administrative authorities of other members ... , for example by decreeing 
performance of the contracts or by awarding damages for their non-perfor-
mance."63 The IMF interpretation further states that Article VIII, Section 2(b) 
supersedes the private international law of exchange controls64 under which 
exchange controls can affect the performance of a contract only if the imposing 
nation provides the governing law of the contract.65 According to the IMF, 
contracts within the scope of Article VIII, Section 2(b) should not be enforced 
59 See Tigert, supra note 21, at 523. Cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICTS OF LAWS §§ 6,188 (1965). 
60 See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895). 
61 Gold, Foreword, 7 Hous. J. INT'L L. I, 10 (1985); Williams, Extraterritorial Enforcement of Exchange 
Control Regulations Under the International Monetary Fund Agreement, 15 VA. J. INT'L L. 319, 321 (1975) 
[hereinafter cited as Williams (1975)]. 
62 FUND AGREEMENT, supra note 30, Art. VIII, § 2(b). The second sentence of Article VIII, Section 
2(b) reads: "In addition, members may, by mutual accord, cooperate in measures for the purpose of 
making the exchange control regulations of either member more effective, provided that such mea-
sures are consistent with this Agreement." The second sentence simply permits members to reach 
agreement among themselves to ensure the effectiveness of legitimate exchange controls. See GOLD, 
IMF PAMPHLET SERIES No. 21, INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MOVEMENTS UNDER THE LAW OF THE INTER-
NATIONAL MONETARY FUND 30 (1977). 
6' International Monetary Fund, Decision No. 446-4 (1949), reprinted in INTERNATIONAL MONETARY 
FUND, SELECTED DECISIONS OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS 233 (10th issue 
1983) [hereinafter cited as SELECTED DECISIONS]. Decision No. 446-4 is also reprinted in Ebenroth & 
Teitz, supra note 25, at 247. 
64 Decision No. 446-4, supra note 63. See also 2 DICEY & MORRIS, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 1023-26 
(J.H.C. Morris 10th ed. 1980); Williams (1975), supra note 61, at 383-84. 
65 For a discussion of the private international law of exchange controls, see MANN, THE LEGAL 
ASPECT OF MONEY 407 (4th ed. 1982). 
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"notwithstanding that under the private international law of the forum, the law 
under which the foreign exchange control regulations are maintained or im-
posed is not the law which governs the exchange contract or its performance."66 
Thus, instead of simply a conflicts of law rule, Article VIII, Section 2(b) is a 
rule of substantive law applicable as part of the governing law of an exchange 
contract, regardless of the forum in which an action on the contract is brought.67 
Defining the proper scope and effect of this rule of substantive law, which is 
part of the national law of all member countries,68 including the United States,69 
has been highly controversiapo 
III. LIBRA BANK AND THE ALLIED BANK CASES 
A. Allied Bank I: The District Court Decision 
To support the denial of Allied Bank's motion for summary judgment on the 
basis of the act of state doctrine, the district court focused on the public, rather 
than the commercial, nature of Costa Rica's payments moratorium and the 
governmental function that the payments moratorium served. 71 In the court's 
view, Costa Rica's use of exchange controls constituted a common governmental 
response to a national economic emergency.72 Accordingly, the court reasoned 
that forcing the Costa Rican banks to make payments in violation of the ex-
change controls would interject the judicial branch of the United States into the 
public acts of Costa Rica. 73 The court concluded that because such interference 
would risk straining relations between the United States and Costa Rica, the act 
of state doctrine would bar the Allied Bank syndicate's claim.74 
The governmental function--commercial act dichotomy on which Allied Bank 
I turned-derives from Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba,75 a 1976 
U.S. Supreme Court decision in which a three-justice plurality enunciated a 
66 Decision No. 446-4, supra note 63. 
67 MANN, supra note 65, at 374-75; Williams (1975), supra note 61, at 383-84. See also GOLD, IMF 
PAMPHLET SERIES No.3., THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND AND PRIVATE BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS: 
SOME LEGAL EFFECTS OF THE ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT 23 (1965) [hereinafter cited as GOLD (1965)]. 
68 Decision No. 446-4, supra note 63. 
69 22 U.S.C. § 286h (1982) ("the first sentence of Article VIII, section 2(b) ... shall have full force 
and effect in the United States"). 
70 For a proposed analysis of the scope and effect of Article VIII, Section 2(b), see infra notes 239-
82 and accompanying text. 
71 Allied Bank I, 566 F. Supp. at 1443. 
72 !d. 
73 !d. at 1444. 
74 !d. 
75 425 U.S. 682 (1976). 
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commercial act exception to the act of state doctrine. 76 The Dunhill plurality 
refused to include within the definition of an act of state "the repudiation of a 
purely commercial obligation owed by a sovereign or by one of its commercial 
instrumentalities."77 The plurality reasoned that allowing a foreign state to 
repudiate its commercial obligations under the protection of the act of state 
doctrine would afford the foreign state greater immunity from judicial remedies 
than is available under the restrictive view of sovereign immunity.7s The plu-
rality nevertheless recognized that the act of state doctrine should bar claims 
involving the validity of a foreign state's exercise of its "governmental authority" 
within its own territory.79 At the time of Allied Bank I, the Second Circuit Court 
of Appeals appeared to have endorsed this rule-oriented governmental func-
tion-commercial act dichotomy.so Accordingly, by focusing on the public nature 
and governmental function of the exchange controls in Allied Bank I, the district 
court distinguished Dunhill and avoided the commercial act exception.S ! 
B. Libra Bank 
The Libra Bank decision preceded Allied Bank I by two days, but it was later 
amended to incorporate an Article VIII, Section 2(b) analysis. Both cases in-
volved roughly identical facts. In Libra Bank, a syndicate of U.S. and foreign 
banks, for which Libra Bank served as representative, made loans in 1980 to a 
Costa Rican bank, which the Costa Rican government wholly owned.82 The bank 
76Id. at 695. In Dunhill. a U.S. cigar importer sought recovery of excess payments made to Cuban 
cigar manufacturers for transactions entered into before the nationalization of the manufacturers. 
The operators of the nationalized plants refused to reimburse the importer. Id. at 684-90. Reasoning 
that the refusal by the operators, agents of the Cuban government, was committed in the conduct of 
purely commercial operations, the plurality concluded that the claim involved no act of state. Id. at 
706. 
77 !d. at 695. 
78Id. at 699. Since 1952, the United States has followed the restrictive view of sovereign immunity, 
according to which a foreign sovereign is immune from the jurisdiction of U.S. courts in actions based 
on its public acts (jure imperii), but is not immune with regard to private or commercial acts (jure 
gestionis). See Letter of Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser, to Acting Attorney General, 26 DEP'T STATE 
BULL. 984 (1952). The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq. (1982), 
codifies the restrictive view of sovereign immunity. In contrast, under the absolute theory of sovereign 
immunity, a foreign sovereign cannot, without its consent, be denied immunity from the jurisdiction 
of courts of another sovereign. E.g., Berizzi Brothers Co. v. 5.5. Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562 (1926) (allowing 
immunity to a merchant vessel owned and operated by a foreign government). See generally STEVENSON, 
BROWN & DAMROSCH, UNITED STATES LAW OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY (1983); Hill, A Policy Analysis of 
the American Law of Sovereign State Immunity, 50 FORDHAM L. REV. 155 (1981). 
79 Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 706. 
80 See Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68, 73 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1977); 
Zaitzeff & Kunz, supra note 25, at 466. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has recently disavowed 
that it ever adopted the commercial act exception. Braka v. Bancomer, S.N.C., 762 F.2d 222, 225 (2d 
Cir. 1985). 
8! Allied Bank I, 566 F. Supp. at 1444. 
82 Libra Bank, 570 F. Supp. at 874. 
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defaulted on debt payments in August 1981 after Costa Rica effected its pay-
ments moratorium through exchange control regulations.83 In the initial deci-
sion, the district court granted summary judgment to the Libra Bank syndicate 
and ordered the Costa Rican bank to repay all principal and interest due on 
promissory notes executed in favor of the syndicate.84 
The Libra Bank court's act of state analysis rested on the categorical exception 
to the act of state doctrine referred to as the "territorial limitation".85 The 
territorial limitation restricts the preclusive effect of the act of state doctrine to 
claims that would require a U.S. court to examine the validity of a foreign state's 
act the object of which may be accomplished solely within its territory.86 This 
construction confines the scope of the act of state doctrine to the literal terms 
of its traditional formulation. 87 Furthermore, it permits a U.S. court to examine 
the validity of a foreign state's act which requires extraterritorial enforcement.88 
While recognizing that analysis under the territorial limitation pivots on iden-
tifying the situs of the debt or other property purportedly affected by a foreign 
state's act,89 the Libra Bank court departed from a "formalistic" situs approach.90 
Under a traditional situs analysis, the act of state doctrine applies if the property 
involved was located in the foreign state at the time of the act, but property is 
deemed to have that situs only if the foreign state had dominion and control 
over it.91 When the foreign state's act affects a debt, the foreign state is deemed 
to exercise dominion and control only if it has the power to enforce and collect 
the debt.92 This power depends on jurisdiction over the debtor. 93 The Libra 
83 Id. at 875. 
84Id. at 874. The court ordered the Costa Rican bank to repay the loan principal in four successive 
monthly installments plus interest due at the time of the default and interest accrued after the default 
pursuant to the loan agreements between the bank and the Libra Bank syndicate. !d. at 887-91. 
85Id. at 877, 881-82. For a history of the territorial limitation, see Note, Rehabilitation, supra note 
34, at 623-31. 
86 See, e.g., Banco Para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba v. First Nat'l City Bank, 744 F.2d 237, 241-
42 (2d Cir. 1984); Garcia v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 735 F.2d 645, 650 (2d Cir. 1984); First 
Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 658 F.2d 895, 901 (2d Cir. 1981); Note, Rehabilitation, 
supra note 34, at 631. 
87 See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
88 See, e.g., Vishipco Line v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 660 F.2d 854, 862-63 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. 
denied, 459 U.S. 976 (1982); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chemical Bank New York Trust Co., 658 F.2d 
903,908 (2d Cir. 1981); Republic of Iraq v. First Nat'l City Bank, 353 F.2d 47, 51 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. 
denied, 382 U.S. 1027 (1965). 
89 Libra Bank, 570 F. Supp. at 877-81. 
90 !d. at 884. 
91 See, e.g., United Bank Ltd. v. Cosmic Int'l, Inc., 542 F.2d 868, 874 (2d Cir. 1972); Tabacalera 
Severiano Jorge, S.A. v. Standard Cigar Co., 392 F.2d 706, 714 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 
924 (1968). 
92 E.g., Garcia, 735 F.2d at 650 n.5; Kunstsammlungen Zu Weimar v. Elicofon, 678 F.2d 1150, 1160 
(2d Cir. 1982); Menendez v. Saks & Co .. 485 F.2d 1355, 1364 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'd on other grounds sub 
nom. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976). 
93 E.g., Garcia, 735 F.2d at 650 n.5; United Bank Ltd. v. Cosmic Int'l, Inc., 542 F.2d 868, 873-74 
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Bank court recognized that, under the traditional situs analysis, when a debtor 
has defaulted and is domiciled in the foreign state imposing a payments mor-
atorium, the debt, or the "legal right to repayment of the debt owed",94 would 
be located in the foreign state, since that state would have jurisdiction over the 
debtor.9s To avoid the preclusive effect of the act of state doctrine, the court 
limited the applicability of the traditional situs analysis to the factual context in 
which a foreign state attempts "to seize for itself a debt to another".96 
In order to apply the territorial limitation in the context of a payments 
moratorium, the Libra Bank court fashioned a contacts approach focusing on 
whether adjudication would "frustrate the foreign state's reasonable expecta-
tions of dominion over the legal rights involved therein so as to vex our amicable 
relations with that foreign nation."97 Under this approach, when a state's objec-
(2d Cir. 1972). See also Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215, 222 (1905) (establishing that a debt follows the 
debtor). 
Several courts have explained the concept of dominion as the ability to perform a "fait accompli". 
Under this view, a debt is located in a state only if that state's acts come to "complete fruition" within 
its territory, without assistance by a forum state besides itself. See, e.g., Maltina Corp. v. Cawy Bottling 
Co., 462 F.2d 1021, 1028 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1060 (1972); Tabacalera Severiano 
Jorge, S.A. v. Standard Cigar Co., 392 F.2d 714, 715-16 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 924 
(1968). See also Garcia, 735 F.2d at 650 n.5. Accordingly, this view holds that the simple "documentary 
execution of whatever legal action the foreign state takes toward the property or its national" does 
not automatically warrant application of the act of state doctrine to claims regarding the legal rights 
in the property purportedly affected. Maltina Corp., 462 F.2d at 1025 n.3. See also RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 43 comments a and b (1965) (an act 
requiring participation or acquiescence by another state is not "fully executed" by the state declaring 
the act). 
94 Libra Bank, 570 F. Supp. at 878. 
95 [d. at 881. 
96 /d. The court reasoned that in a default situation, a creditor has a choice of suing in the debtor's 
domicile or wherever the debt is located. /d. In contrast, the jurisdiction-over-the-debtor rule developed 
in situations in which a foreign state had purportedly expropriated property, the rights to which 
existed outside its jurisdiction. See, e.g., Vishipco Line v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 660 F.2d 854 
(2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 976 (1982) (Vietnamese expropriation decree did not affect debt 
owed by U.S. bank outside Vietnam); United Bank Ltd. v. Cosmic Int'l, Inc., 542 F.2d 868 (2d Cir. 
1976) (Bangladesh expropriation decree did not reach debt owed by U.S. corporation in New York). 
The Libra Bank court, however, did not establish a rule placing the situs of a debt in the creditor's 
domicile, a rule which courts have consistently rejected. See United Bank, 542 F.2d at 874. Cf Callejo 
v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1985) (act of state doctrine applied where Mexico, the 
acting state, had jurisdiction over the debtors who owed payments on certificates of deposit in Mexico, 
despite the creditors being U.S. nationals); Braka v. Bancomer, S.N.C., 762 F.2d 222 (2d Cir. 1985) 
(same act of state analysis). Rather, in concluding that concurrent jurisdiction of the United States and 
an acting foreign state does not preclude locating the situs of a debt in the United States for act of 
state purposes, the court recognized that jurisdiction over the debtor does not determine the situs of 
a debt, but is necessary for the foreign state to exercise complete dominion over the debt, or property, 
involved. See Libra Bank, 570 F. Supp. at 881. Cf Weston Banking Corp. v. Turkiye Garanti Bankasi, 
57 N.Y.2d 315, 442 N.E.2d 1195,456 N.Y.S.2d 684 (1982) (concurrent jurisdiction of New York and 
Turkey did not preclude locating the debt in New York for act of state purposes). 
97 Libra Bank, 570 F. Supp. at 884. Other courts have also referred to a foreign state's expectations 
of dominion as the concern underlying the territorial limitation. See United Bank Ltd. v. Cosmic 
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tively reasonable expectations of dominion are low because the legal incidents 
of a debt place it outside the state, the risk of affronting the foreign state is 
reduced, and, therefore, the act of state doctrine should not apply.98 Applying 
this approach, the court held that the act of state doctrine did not apply since 
significant incidents of the debt owed to the Libra Bank syndicate placed its 
situs in the United States.99 
Turning to a comity analysis, the court denied giving "effect to the Costa 
Rican decrees since a foreign state's effective confiscation of property, without 
compensation, is repugnant to the Constitution and laws" of the United States. 100 
For act of state purposes, the court had labeled the moratorium as only "the 
attempt by a foreign nation to avoid payment of a debt which it concededly 
owes to its creditors."lol For comity purposes, though, the court characterized 
the Costa Rican payments moratorium as an attempted confiscation and rejected 
the argument that the moratorium attempted to defer debt payments without 
extinguishing the underlying debt. l02 
In amending its decision, the court held that Article VIII, Section 2(b) of the 
Fund Agreement did not support the Costa Rican bank's motion to reargue. 103 
Three alternative reasons, each reflecting a different construction of Article 
VIII, Section 2(b) were provided. First, the court reasoned that international 
loan agreements are not exchange contracts within the meaning of the provi-
sion. l04 Second, the court, assuming arguendo that international loan agreements 
are exchange contracts, reasoned that exchange controls imposed after the 
formation of a valid contract do not render unenforceable the contractual 
obligation to perform. lOS Third, assuming arguendo that intervening exchange 
International, Inc., 542 F.2d 868, 875 (2d Cir. 1976); Maltina Corp. v. Cawy Bottling Co., 462 F.2d 
1021,1028-29 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied 409 U.S. 1060 (1972). 
98 Libra Bank, 570 F. Supp. at 883-84. The court nonetheless recognized that "[wlithin its territorial 
boundaries, the foreign state has reasonable expectations of complete dominion over property", and 
any acts by U.S. courts declaring expropriations of property solely within the foreign state's jurisdiction 
would clearly affront the foreign sovereign. !d. at 883. 
99 [d. at 884. The court had earlier recited incidents placing the debt in the United States: the debtor 
consented to the jurisdiction of U.S. courts; a U.S. court had jurisdiction over the debtor; New York 
provided the governing law of the loan agreements; the debtor was to make all payments in New York 
City; the promissory notes stated the debtor's unconditional obligation to perform; and the debtor 
had substantial assets located in the United States at the time Costa Rica imposed its exchange controls. 
!d. at 881-82. 
100 [d. at 882. 
101 !d. at 880-81. 
102 !d. at 878. The court concluded that the Costa Rican payments moratorium was legally indistin-
guishable from the decrees at issue in Republic of Iraq v. First National City Bank, 353 F.2d 47 (2d 
Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1027 (1966), by which the Republic of Iraq purported to confiscate 
all assets of its deposed monarch, including accounts with a New York trust company. 
103 [d. at 896-97. 
104 !d. at 900. 
105 [d. 
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controls do affect performance of a valid executory contract, the court reasoned 
that the Costa Rican banks failed to prove that the Costa Rican exchange controls 
were imposed consistently with the Fund Agreement, by showing either that 
the IMF approved the restrictions on current transactions or that the controls 
only affected capital, not current, transactions. 106 
C. Allied Bank II: The Appeal 
The court of appeals affirmed the dismissal of Allied Bank's claim on the 
basis of comity alone,107 reasoning that Costa Rica's payments moratorium did 
not amount to a confiscation of propertyl08 but was consistent with U.S. bank-
ruptcy laws lo9 and U.S. foreign policy. I 10 Implicitly overruling the comity analysis 
in Libra Bank,111 the court characterized the moratorium as "merely a deferral 
of payments while [Costa Rica] attempted in good faith to renegotiate its obli-
gations."112 The court analogized the moratorium to provisions under the U.S. 
Bankruptcy Code which afford insolvent businesses and municipalities an au-
tomatic stay of collection actions in order to institute a plan for the reorgani-
zation of debts. ll3 Furthermore, the court relied I 14 on Canadian Southern Railway 
Company v. Gebhard,ll5 an 1883 U.S. Supreme Court decision recognizing as a 
matter of comityl16 a reorganization plan, approved by the Canadian Parliament, 
for an insolvent government-owned Canadian corporation.!17 The court addi-
tionally concluded that U.S. foreign policy, indicated by the restructuring of 
Costa Rica's official debts by the United States and other government creditors1l8 
106 !d. at 901-02. For a discussion of capital and current transactions within the context of the 
requirement that exchange controls be imposed or maintained consistently with the Fund Agreement, 
see infra notes 268-69 and accompanying text. 
107 See Allied Bank II, 733 F.2d at 27. 
108 Id. at 26. 
109Id. 
1I0Id. at 26-27. 
III See supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text. 
112 Allied Bank II, 733 F.2d at 26. 
113Id. 
114Id. 
11'109 U.S. 527 (1883). 
116 See id. at 539. 
117 !d. at 535. 
118 In January 1983, the United States and several other nations signed a Paris Club Agreed Minute. 
Allied Bank II, 733 F.2d at 25. The Paris Club refers to an informal meeting of representatives of a 
debtor nation seeking debt relief and its governmental creditors, which is convened only at the request 
of the debtor nation. A Paris Club meeting, which follows no written procedures but which is organized 
under the auspices of the French Finance Ministry, produces an Agreed Minute, a non-binding 
document that provides a guide for later binding agreements between the debtor nation and each 
creditor government. See Meissner, Thoughts on More Comprehensive Procedures for Rescheduling of Sov-
ereign Debt in PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, COMMERCIAL LAW & PRACTICE HANDBOOK SERIES No. 318, 
THE INTERNATIONAL DEBT PROBLEM AND ITS IMPACT ON FINANCE AND TRADE 135 (1984); IMF (1983), 
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and by congressional support for continued aid to Costa Rica,ll9 mandated 
recognition of the payments moratorium 120 and restructuring of all commercial 
bank debt owed by Costa Rica. l2l 
D. Allied Bank III: The Rehearing 
To reverse the act of state analysis of Allied Bank I, the court of appeals in 
rehearing the case determined that for purposes of the territorial limitation to 
the act of state doctrine, the property affected by Costa Rica's payments mor-
atorium had a U.S. situs. I22 The property involved was the syndicate's right to 
receive loan repayments from the Costa Rican banks. I23 The court of appeals 
first determined that this property did not have a Costa Rican situs, since, in 
the court's view, Costa Rica could not wholly accomplish within its dominion a 
taking of the syndicate's property.I24 Alternatively, to obtain the same result 
under an "ordinary situs analysis", 125 the court reasoned that U.S. contacts with 
the debt I26 and U.S. interests in enforcing the debt I27 outweighed Costa Rica's 
concurrent jurisdiction over the agreements and interest in having its morato-
rium prevent the payments owed to the Allied Bank syndicate. I28 Accordingly, 
the court concluded that, since the taking did not occur in Costa Rica, the act 
of state doctrine did not apply.I29 
supra note 8, at 15. See generally Reiffel, The Paris Club, 1978-1983, 23 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 83 
(1984); Camdessus, Governmental Creditors and the Role of the Paris Club, in DEFAULT AND RESCHEDULING, 
supra note 7, at 125. Private sector creditors, including banks and other commercial lending institutions, 
normally restructure debts of a debtor nation initiating negotiations for debt relief through an informal 
forum referred to as the London Club. See Hudes, Coordination of Paris Club and London Club Resched-
ulings, 17 N.Y.U. J. INT'L. L. & POL'y 553, 560-62 (1985). Negotiations produce a term sheet, which 
resembles a Paris Club Agreed Minute in that it serves as a non-binding understanding outlining 
restructuring arrangements. See Meissner, supra this note, at 138. 
119 Allied Bank II, 733 F.2d at 25. 
120Id. at 27. 
121 See id. 
122 Allied Bank III, 757 F.2d at 523. 
123 Id. at 521. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. 
126Id. The contacts listed by the court were that the debtor banks consented to jurisdiction in New 
York, the debtor banks agreed to make payments in New York City in United States dollars, Allied 
Bank, the syndicate's agent, is a New York Bank, and some of the negotiations for the loans took place 
in the United States. Id. 
127 Id. at 521-22. The court identified the U.S. interests: maintaining New York's status as a world 
financial center; maintaining New York's role as "the international clearing center for United States 
dollars"; maintaining the high level of lending by U.S. banks to foreign debtors; and ensuring "creditors 
entitled to payment in the United States in United States dollars under contracts subject to the 
jurisdiction of United States courts" that their rights will be protected "in accordance with recognized 
principles of contract law". Id. at 521-22. 
128Id. at 522. 
129Id. 
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In order to vacate the comity analysis in Allied Bank II, the court next held 
that the Costa Rican payments moratorium was contrary to U.S. foreign policy 
and principles of contract law. 130 According to the court, the "unilateral attempt 
to repudiate private, commercial obligations" was inconsistent with the "orderly 
resolution of international debt problems" contemplated by U.S. policies,l3l 
including reliance on the IMF to coordinate the restructuring of private debt. I32 
Furthermore, the court recognized that giving effect to the moratorium would 
vitiate the specific provision in the loan agreements that failure by Costa Rica's 
Central Bank to provide U.S. currency for debt payments would not perma-
nently excuse the Costa Rican banks' obligation to make loan repayments. 133 
Yet, while the court held that the moratorium did not excuse the obligation to 
make repayments for more than ten days, it recognized that the moratorium 
affected the "potential enforceability of the judgment."I3. 
IV. AN ANALYSIS OF ALLIED BANK III 
A. Introduction 
Due to the interrelationships and complexities of the act of state doctrine, the 
principle of comity, and Article VIII, Section 2(b) of the Fund Agreement, the 
following analysis of whether a foreign state, after Allied Bank III, can legally 
defer external debt payments without its creditors' consent proceeds on three 
I30Id. at 522. 
131Id. The court also interjected that the moratorium was contrary to the interests of the United 
States as a major source of private international credit. Id. 
132 Id. In an amicus brief advocating a reversal, the U.S. government identified a five-point strategy 
for dealing with nations having debt servicing problems: (1) economic adjustment by borrowing 
countries designed to stabilize their economies and restore sustainable external positions; (2) an IMF 
adequately equipped to help borrowers design economic adjustment programs and provide balance 
of payments financing on a temporary basis while adjustments are made; (3) readiness of governmental 
monetary authorities in creditor countries to provide short-term liquidity support, when essential to 
assist selected borrowers that are formulating IMF-supported adjustment plans; (4) encouragement to 
private markets to provide prudent levels of financing to borrowing countries in the process of 
implementing such plans; and (5) resumption of sustainable, non-inflationary economic expansion and 
maintenance of open markets for trade, both in industrial countries and in developing countries 
having debt problems. Amicus Brief for the United States at 10 n.6. Allied Bank International v. 
Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 757 F.2d 523 (2d Cir. 1985) [hereinafter cited as U.S. Amicus 
Brief]. The New York Clearing House Association, a banking group, and The Rule of Law Committee 
joined by The National Foreign Trade Council, Inc., both representing international trade and 
investment interests, also submitted amicus briefs opposing the Allied Bank II decision. For a discussion 
of the U.S. government and New York Clearing House Association briefs, see Brown, Enforcing 
Sovereign Lending, INT'L FIN. L. REV., July 1984, at 5. For an elaboration on the U.S. debt resolution 
strategy, see Tigert, supra note 21, at 511-12. 
133 Allied Bank III, 757 F.2d at 522. 
134Id. 
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levels. 135 While the discussion tracks the Allied Bank III opinion, it first examines 
the court of appeals' evasion of Article VIII, Section 2(b) within the act of state 
and comity analyses. 136 It next scrutinizes the court's formulation and applica-
tion of the act of state doctrine and the principle of comity.137 The discussion 
then concludes with a proposed construction of Article VIII, Section 2(b), the 
adoption of which would have made the act of state and comity analyses in 
Allied Bank III unnecessary. 138 
B. Act of State Analysis 
1. Applicability of Article VIII, Section 2(b) of the Fund Agreement 
In Sabbatino the U.S. Supreme Court stated that in the presence of "a treaty 
or other unambiguous agreement regarding controlling legal principles" per-
tinent to a particular claim, the act of state doctrine should not apply.139 It 
follows that under Sabbatino, determining the applicability of controlling legal 
principles should be the antecedent step in any act of state analysis. What is not 
immediately clear under Sabbatino, though, is whether the provisions of a treaty 
must be unambiguous in order to supplant application of the act of state 
doctrine itself. 140 On one hand, the Court stated that 
the greater degree of codification or consensus concerning a partic-
ular area of international law, the more appropriate it is for the 
judiciary to render decisions regarding it, since the courts can then 
focus on the application of an agreed upon principle to circum-
135 Some recent commentaries on the Allied Bank decisions have focused only on the act of state 
doctrine, but, as in Allied Bank III, have neglected Article VIII, Section 2(b) and thus have not fully 
evaluated the potential legitimacy of payments moratoria effected through exchange controls. See 
Frumkin, supra note 25, at 469; Note, Resolution of Act of State Disputes, supra note 25, at 901; Comment, 
Debt Situs and The Act of State Doctrine: A Proposal For A More Flexible Standard, 49 ALB. L. REv. 647 
(1985) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Debt Situs]. 
136 For the act of state analysis, see infra notes 139-51 and accompanying text. For the comity 
analysis, see infra notes 205-10 and accompanying text. 
137 For the act of state analysis, see infra notes 152-204 and accompanying text. For the comity 
analysis, see infra notes 211-37 and accompanying text. 
138 See infra notes 238-82 and accompanying text. 
139 Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428. One commentator asserts for this principle to apply, the foreign state's 
act must amount to a "taking" of property. Gold, Exchange Control: Act of State, Public Policy, The IMF's 
Articles of Agreement, and Other Considerations, 7 Hous. J. INT'L L. 13,49-50 (1984) [hereinafter cited as 
Gold, Exchange Control]. Others, however, recognize that in general a treaty supplants the act of state 
doctrine. E.g., Ebenroth & Teitz, supra note 25, at 249; Williams (1975), supra note 61, at 387. For an 
argument against characterizing a payments moratorium as a taking, see infra notes 223-29 and 
accompanying text. 
140 See Gold, Exchange Control, supra note 139, at 51 n.83. Gold states that, although Sabbatino 
requires an unambiguous treaty, whether the decision refers to the existence of a clearly applicable 
treaty or the clarity of the provisions of such a ueaty is not resolved. Id. 
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stances of fact rather than on the sensItive task of establishing a 
principle inconsistent with the national interest or with international 
justice. [4[ 
427 
On the other hand, according to the Court, a significant division of international 
opinion over the international law that covers a litigated issue justifies applying 
the act of state doctrine. [42 The Sabbatino Court, however, directed this latter 
observation toward the absence of uniform principles of customary international 
law, rather than in reference to an ambiguous treaty.[43 Furthermore, if a court 
applies the act of state doctrine simply because unclear treaty provisions are 
difficult to construe, it would eschew established principles of interpretation 
developed to glean the intent of signatories to ambiguous treaties.[44 Courts 
should, therefore, understand Sabbatino to foreclose the use of the act of state 
141 Sabbatino. 376 U.S. at 428. 
14' See id. at 428-30. The Sabbatino Court held: 
[t]he Judicial Branch will not examine the validity of a taking of property within its own 
territory by a foreign sovereign government. extant and recognized by this country at the 
time of suit. in the absence of a treaty or other unambiguous agreement regarding controlling 
legal principles. even if the complaint alleges that the taking violates customary international 
law. 
!d. at 428. The Hickenlooper Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1964. 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) 
(1982) (amending the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961) in effect reverses the Sabbatino holding to the 
extent that the statute prohibits application of the act of state doctrine where a claim asserts that an 
expropriation violates international law, which Congress construes as requiring compensation for 
confiscated property. 
143 See Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428-30. 
144 Courts recognize that treaties, like other contracts, may require interpretation to effectuate their 
purposes. See, e.g., Baccardi Corp. v. Domenesch, 311 U.S. 150, 163 (1940); Board of County Com-
missioners of Dade County v. Aerolineas Peru ansa, S.A., 307 F.2d 802, 806 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 
371 U.S. 961 (1962). The Sabbatino Court may have additionally recognized that such interpretative 
tasks do not implicate the act of state doctrine. In the Court's view, the shifting interpretations of 
customary international law, due to divergent ideologies in capital importing and capital exporting 
nations, justified applying the act of state doctrine to bar challenging a foreign state's expropriation 
decree. See Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428-30. The Court nonetheless recognized, "[t]here are, of course, 
areas of international law in which consensus as to standards is greater and which do not represent a 
battleground of conflicting ideologies. This decision in no way intimates that the courts of this country 
are broadly foreclosed from considering questions of international law." Id. at 430 n.34. Inasmuch as 
a treaty represents a meeting of the minds of its signatories, a treaty's provisions should not present 
"a battleground of conflicting ideologies". Rather, a treaty should represent a consensus of purposes 
the effectuation of which may call for a court's interpretation of them. Nevertheless, courts have 
recently used the act of state doctrine to avoid the task of treaty interpretation for ambiguous 
provisions. See Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101, 1118 (5th Cir. 1985) (application of a treaty 
to supplant the act of state doctrine "depends on pragmatic considerations, including both clarity of 
the relevant principles of international law and the potential implications of a decision on our foreign 
policy"); Ethiopian Spice Extraction Co. v. Kalamazoo Spice Extraction Co., 543 F. Supp. 1224, 1230 
(W.D. Mich. 1982), rev'd sub nom. Kalamazoo Spice Extraction Co. v. Provisional Military Government 
of Socialist Ethiopia, 729 F.2d 422, 423 (6th Cir. 1984) (act of state doctrine was not supplanted by a 
treaty the pertinent provision of which was "inherently general, doubtful, and susceptible of multiple 
interpretation"). 
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doctrine as a means to avoid treaty interpretation, however difficult that task 
may be. '45 
Under this view of Sabbatino, the court of appeals in Allied Bank III should 
have determined the applicability of Article VIII, Section 2(b) of the Fund 
Agreement as the antecedent step in its act of state analysis. Since the Fund 
Agreement is a treaty,146 Article VIII, Section 2(b), if applicable, should have 
governed the extraterritorial enforcement of Costa Rica's exchange controls 
and thus should have superseded the act of state doctrine. 147 While the Libra 
Bank court recognized Article VIII, Section 2(b) as an independent defense,'48 
its ambivalence in construing the provision's applicability149 exhibited the critical 
need for the court of appeals to clarify the treatment of exchange controls 
under the Fund Agreement. '5o By avoiding Article VIII, Section 2(b), the court 
of appeals not only failed to resolve this uncertainty, but also forced itself to 
examine the second step in the act of state analysis, which consists of determin-
ing the applicability of the act of state doctrine itself. '51 
2. Rethinking the Act of State Analysis 
While the court of appeals in Allied Bank III should have applied Article VIII, 
Section 2(b) to determine the unenforceability of the loan agreements after 
Costa Rica imposed exchange controls,'52 courts faced with claims involving a 
foreign state's unilateral debt restructuring attempts will nevertheless need to 
examine the applicability of the act of state doctrine. With respect to the effect 
of exchange controls, a court, favoring a restrictive reading of Article VIII, 
Section 2(b), may conclude that the provision altogether does not provide the 
rule of decision. '53 Alternatively, a court may conclude that because Article 
VIII, Section 2(b) prescribes unenforceability only and not enforceability, a 
145 One commentator, advocating that the act of state doctrine does not bar courts from interpreting 
ambiguous international law, states, "[t]he difficulty of a judicial task is no excuse for eschewing that 
task .... This is so in the development of international law as well." Mathias, supra note 40, at 399. 
146 See supra note 30. 
147 Ebenroth & Teitz, supra note 25, at 249. See also Williams (1975), supra note 61, at 387 (arguing 
that Article VIII, Section 2(b) supplants the act of state doctrine). 
148 Libra Bank, 570 F. Supp. at 896 n.l. 
149 See supra notes 99-101 and accompanying text. 
150 Confusion concerning the effect of the Fund Agreement and the treatment of exchange controls 
under U.S. law continues. In dictum, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stated in Callejo 
v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d llOI, ll18-19 (5th Cir. 1985), that Article VIII, Section 2(a) of the Fund 
Agreement is too ambiguous to supplant the act of state doctrine in a claim involving Mexican exchange 
controls. This decision evinces the need for a clarification of the applicability of the Fund Agreement, 
and dramatizes that the confused treatment of exchange controls will persist, unless courts cease using 
the act of state doctrine as an excuse from treaty interpretation. 
151 See supra notes 122-34 and accompanying text. 
152 See supra notes 139-51 and accompanying text. 
153 Gold, Exchange Control, supra note 140. at 48. 
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contract may not be enforceable due to the act of state doctrine, despite the 
absence of a mandate under Article VIII, Section 2(b) to give the acting foreign 
state's exchange controls extraterritorial effect. 154 With respect to a foreign 
state's attempt to impose a unilateral payments moratorium through a means 
other than exchange controls,155 a court may conclude that, without directly 
restricting the availability or use of foreign exchange, a foreign state's conduct 
does not amount to a restriction proscribed in Article VIII, Section 2(a) of the 
Fund Agreementl56 and, therefore, may implicate the act of state doctrine. 
Courts determining the applicability of the act of state doctrine, however, should 
beware the flaws of the act of state analysis in Allied Bank III.157 
A fundamental flaw in Allied Bank III consists of the transformation of the 
act of state doctrine into a choice-of-law rule through the court of appeals' 
adherence to the rigid territorial limitation. 158 Under its ordinary situs analysis, 
the court of appeals based its situs determination on the grounds that the United 
States, not Costa Rica, had more significant contacts with the loan agreements 
and underlying debt and had overwhelming interests in enforcement of the 
debt obligations in dispute. 159 The Libra Bank court similarly reached its act of 
state conclusion by locating the situs of the debt on the basis of its contacts with 
the United States. 160 These approaches in essence amount to choice-of-law rules 
for ascertaining the governing law of a contract. 161 This merger of legal con-
154Id. at 49. 
155 Developing countries in Latin America have expressed the possibility of simply withholding 
interest payments to commercial banks. Wall St. j., December 23. 1985. at 19. col. I. Such withholding 
is distinguishable from an outright repudiation of debts. as Fidel Castro of Cuba has urged upon 
unreceptive debtor nations. See Bus. WK .. November 4. 1985. at 49. In the case of a repudiation. the 
Hickenlooper Amendment would preclude application of the act of state doctrine. See supra note 142. 
For a discussion differentiating between deferrals and repudiations. see infra notes 223-29 and 
accompanying text. 
156 FUND AGREEMENT. supra note 30. art. VIII. § 2(a). For a definition of the scope of Article VIII. 
Section 2. see infra note 268 and accompanying text. 
157 See infra notes 158-75 and accompanying text. 
158 Courts and commentators often consider the act of state doctrine as merely a choice-of-law rule. 
possibly in recognition that the effect of its application is to enforce a foreign state's act. See. e.g .• 
Callejo v. Bancomer. S.A .. 764 F.2d I \0 I. 1114 (5th Cir. 1985) (act of state doctrine is a "super-choice-
of-law rule"); Comment. Debt Situs. supra note 135. at 650 (act of state doctrine is a "mandatory choice 
of law rule"). 
159 See supra notes 125-28 and accompanying text. 
160 See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text. 
161 In the absence of a governing law clause. courts applying New York law follow a "grouping of 
contacts" approach by which a contract is deemed governed by the substantive law of the jurisdiction 
"which has the most significant contacts with the matter in dispute." Auten v. Auten. 308 N.Y. 155. 
160. 124 N.E.2d 99. \02 (1954). Alternatively. a government interest approach may supply the 
governing law of a contract according to the jurisdiction having the greatest interest in the disputed 
matter. Krauss v. Manhattan Life Insurance Co .• 643 F.2d 98. 101-02 (2d Cir. 1981). See generally 
Gruson. Controlling Choice of Law in SOVEREIGN LENDING: MANAGING LENDING RISK 53-54 (M. Gruson 
& R. Reisner eds. 1984); Gruson. Governing-Law Cmuses in International and Interstate Commercial Agree-
ments-New York's Approach. 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 207. 209-10 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Gruson 
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cepts, however, fails to distinguish between the separate functions served by the 
act of state doctrine and choice-of-Iaw principles. Choice-of-Iaw principles are 
intended to effectuate the expectations of contracting parties as to which body 
of substantive law governs their contractual rights and obligations. 162 In contrast, 
the act of state doctrine is a prudential policyl63 derived from the notion of a 
separation of powers. 164 Rather than considering contractual expectations, the 
act of state doctrine is concerned with the justiciability of claims the adjudication 
of which could interfere with U.S. foreign policy conducted by the political 
branches of the federal government. 165 The Allied Bank III court nevertheless 
failed to make this distinction. 166 
The resulting conceptual merger risks thwarting an objective of the act of 
state doctrine, which is to prevent a court from disrupting U.S. foreign affairs 
by affronting a foreign sovereign. 167 The court of appeals' situs determination 
method, based on a subjective balancing of interests, could especially be deemed 
to exhibit an unfair judicial proclivity in favor of U.S. private interests. Although 
the governmental interest analysis approach for determining choice-of-Iaw calls 
for a balancing of conflicting interests of states affected by an event underlying 
a claim,16B an act of state analysis is simply an affirmation of, and need not 
replicate, a choice-of-Iaw analysis. 169 Interest balancing as part of the act of state 
analysis not only is conceptually repetitious, but could lead to a derogation of 
a foreign state's interests, affronting the foreign sovereign involved and, therein, 
risking disruption of U.S. foreign affairs contrary to the purpose of the act of 
state doctrine. Yet the merger of the act of state doctrine and choice-of-Iaw 
principles fosters such an anomolous outcome as it confuses private parties' 
(1982)]. In Allied Bank III, the court may have confused the choice-of-law and act of state analyses 
because the loan agreements did not stipulate a governing law. See supra note II and accompanying 
text. 
162 See Gruson (1982), supra note 161, at 207. See also REESE & ROSENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS IN 
CONFLICT OF LAws 576 (8th ed. 1984). 
163 International Association of Machinists v. OPEC, 649 F.2d 1354, 1359 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 
454 U.S. 1163 (1982). 
164 Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 423. 
165 See id. at 427-28. The linkage of the act of state doctrine to the political question doctrine 
recognizes that the act of state doctrine concerns justiciability and the allocation of powers between 
the branches of government. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
166 See supra notes 125-28 and accompanying text. 
167 See Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428. See also Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, N.T. & S.A., 
549 F.2d 597, 607 (9th Cir. 1976) ("The touchstone of Sabbatino-the potential for interference with 
our foreign relations-is the crucial element in determining whether deference should be accorded in 
any given case"). 
168 See Gruson (1982), supra note 161, at 210. 
169 Even if the foreign law applied, the act of state doctrine could nevertheless be applicable. See 
Johansen v. Confederation Life Association, 447 F.2d 175, 180 (2d Cir. 1971) (even if Cuban law 
governs the disposition of a contractual claim, the act of state doctrine would apply if the court's 
decision could necessarily nullify a Cuban decree or regulation). 
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contractual expectations with a foreign state's sensitivities with respect to a U.S. 
court's effect on its national policies and interests. 
Besides the problem of a merger of legal concepts, a related fundamental 
flaw in Allied Bank III, as well as in Libra Bank, concerns application of the 
territorial limitation as a rigid rule to determine whether adjudicating a claim 
would affront a foreign sovereign, implicating the act of state doctrine. Derived 
from the traditional statement of the act of state doctrine,170 the territorial 
limitation embodies the presumption that if a foreign state's act affects the legal 
rights to property outside its territory, a U.S. court's refusal to give effect to 
that act will not affront the foreign state. l7l While the traditional statement is a 
common sense recognition of where territorial sovereignty justifies application 
of the act of state doctrine,172 the presumption embodied in the territorial 
limitation is patently illogical. 173 While as a matter of customary international 
law a nation's laws have no effect beyond the nation's territory,174 a foreign 
state's interests may nevertheless extend beyond its boundaries. With transna-
tional interdependencies created by international financial markets and trade, 
a foreign state's regulation of persons or conduct within its own territory may 
necessarily have effects beyond its borders. Contrary to the presumption of the 
territorial limitation, for a U.S. court to adjudicate the validity of a foreign 
state's acts having extraterritorial effect could, under certain circumstances, 
affront the acting foreign state. 175 The rule-oriented territorial limitation, how-
ever, precludes further inquiry into factors which, for act of state purposes, 
could caution against the adjudication of a claim that in the interests of U.S. 
foreign policy the political branches of the government should resolve. 
Complete deference to, or disavowal of, a foreign state's acts based on the 
governmental function--commercial act dichotomy, as in Allied Bank 1,176 simi-
170 See supra text accompanying note 4. 
171 See supra note 88 and accompanying text. 
172 On this point, the act of state doctrine and the doctrine of sovereign immunity converge. In 
defining the concept of sovereign immunity, the U.S. Supreme Court in Schooner Exchange v. 
M'Faddon, 11 U.S. 478, 481 (1812), stated, "The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is 
necessarily exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by itself." 
173 More technically, the presumption embodied in the territorial limitation presents the fallacy of 
denying the antecedent. The logic pattern of the presumption is as follows: if a foreign state accom-
plishes an act within its own territory, adjudication by a U.S. court would affront the foreign sovereign; 
the foreign state did not accomplish the act within its own territory; therefore, adjudication by a U.S. 
court would not affront· the foreign sovereign. See generally CARNEY & SCHEER, FUNDAMENTALS OF 
LOGIC 201-03 (3d ed. 1980). 
174 See Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 937 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
175 A commentator, criticizing the retention of the territorial limitation in revising the RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (1965), states, "the doctrine does not just 
apply to the acts of foreign sovereigns within their own territory. Rather, it applies to acts, wherever 
undertaken, that express the public policy of a sovereign as to persons or conduct within its territory." 
Rosenthal,jurisdictional Conflicts Between Sovereign Nations, 19 INT'L LAW. 487, 499 (1985). 
176 See supra notes 71-81 and accompanying text. 
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larly suffers from rigidity. This approach, though, would encourage expansion 
of the preclusive effect of the act of state doctrine: to implicate the act of state 
doctrine, a foreign state could simply identify the public, as opposed to com-
mercial, nature of its acts and contrive governmental functions that they pur-
portedly serve. Furthermore, it could support application of the act of state 
doctrine where claims involve acts dealing with finance and trade, such as the 
exchange controls in Libra Bank177 and the Allied Bank cases,178 which are of a 
mixed public and commercial nature. 179 To devise more rules to clarify the 
government function-commercial act dichotomy, however, would only obscure 
the flexibility sought by the Sabbatino Court in formulating and applying the act 
of state doctrine. 180 
In order to attain the ultimate goal of the act of state doctrine-to preserve a 
uniform national foreign policy conducted by the political branches without 
interference by the judiciary _181 courts should abandon the rule-oriented act of 
state analyses and implement a flexible, two-part approach. Under this proposal 
to determine the applicability of the act of state doctrine,182 a court should 
determine, first, whether adjudication would likely affront the foreign state the 
acts of which are at issue in a claim and, second, whether adjudication would 
likely interfere with policies of the executive branch specifically addressing the 
nature of the claim involved. 183 The first inquiry concerning comity in the sense 
177 See supra text accompanying note 83. 
178 See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text. 
179 On one hand, it has been recognized that ',[c]ontrol of the national currency and of foreign 
exchange is a necessary attribute of sovereignty." Naamloze Venootschap Suiker-Fabrick v. Chase, III 
F. Supp. 833, 845 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). On the other hand, declaring a halt to the repayment of external 
debt constitutes an act that an individual debtor can perform, thereby indicating that exchange control 
regulations effecting a payments moratorium are not inherently sovereign acts but may be of a 
commercial nature. See Zaitzeff & Kunz, supra note 25, at 480. 
180 The Sabbatino Court sought to avoid "an inflexible and all-encompassing rule". Sabbatino, 376 
U.S. at 428. 
lSI See Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 423. 
IS2 The inapplicability of controlling legal principles presupposes the necessity of proceeding to this 
step in the act of state analysis. See supra notes 139-51 and accompanying text. 
IS3 Despite its failure to adumbrate a clear test, the Sabbatino Court in essence adhered to a two-part 
analysis. After addressing how judicial action evaluating the validity of a foreign state's expropriation 
decree could affront the foreign state, the Court next considered how adjudication resulting in such 
an affront could impair the executive branch's negotiations for settling on compensation for expro-
priated property. See Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428-32. Furthermore, in Associated Container Transpor-
tation (Australia) Ltd. v. United States, 705 F.2d 53, 61-62 (2d Cir. 1983), the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit, although in a claim not involving a debt or the situs of property, followed an 
act of state analysis considering whether adjudication would either frustrate policies of the U.S. Justice 
Department or affront a foreign nation by inquiring into the validity or motives of its acts. See also 
International Association of Machinists v. OPEC, 649 F.2d 1354, 1360-61 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 
454 U.S. 1163 (1982) (act of state analysis considering effects of adjudicating antitrust claim on U.S. 
relations with OPEC nations and on U.S. policies dealing with the oil question). 
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of amicable international relations balances factors l84 gauging whether the act-
ing foreign state has objectively reasonable expectations l85 that its acts will be 
accorded extraterritorial enforcement and whether adjudication of a claim in-
volving those acts should be avoided. 186 Primary, although not exclusive, factors 
for this evaluation should include whether the foreign state had dominion over 
contacts with the event underlying the legal claim at issue; whether not applying 
foreign law would seriously impair the foreign state's important, legitimate 
governmental interests; and whether giving effect to the foreign state's act would 
184 Generally, courts outside the Second Circuit have favored a balancing approach to evaluate the 
risk that adjudication of a claim would disrupt international relations by affronting a foreign sovereign. 
See, e.g., Compania de Gas de Nuevo Laredo v. Entex, Inc., 686 F.2d 322, 325 (5th Cir. 1982); Int'l 
Association of Machinists v. OPEC, 649 F.2d 1354, 1360-61 (9th Cir. 1981), ceTl. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 
(1982). The Second Circuit Court of Appeals recently has also expressed its favor for a balancing 
approach. See Associated Container Transportation (Australia) Ltd. v. United States, 705 F.2d 53, 61 
(2d Cir. 1!l83). See also Rasoulzadeh v. Associated Press, 574 F. Supp. 854, 860 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) 
(interpreting decisions by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals as not requiring a rigid, rule-oriented 
act of state analysis). Commentators, however, have criticized a balancing approach as allowing courts 
to make decisions affecting foreign policy, which the act of state doctrine was intended to avoid. See, 
e.g., Henckin, The Foreign Affairs Power of the Federal Courts: Sabbatino, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 805, 826 
(1964); Note, Judicial Balancing, supra note 40, at 328-29. 
185 Whereas in Allied Bank III the court of appeals focused on whether Costa Rica had dominion 
over the debts in dispute, the Libra Bank court recognized that whether a judicial act could affront a 
foreign state depends on expectations of dominion, rather than dominion per se. See Allied Bank III, 
757 F.2d at 521; Libra Bank, 570 F. Supp. at 883. The Libra Bank court interpreted Costa Rica's 
expectations in light of "the principle of objective reasonableness underlying the territorial limitation" . 
Libra Bank, 570 F. Supp. at 884. This principle should counsel against deferring to the subjective 
expectations of a foreign state when such deference, due to its detrimental impact on international 
comity in general, would be unreasonable. 
186 This inquiry would not alter the result contemplated by the traditional statement of the act of 
state doctrine, so long as it is not attenuated to support a rigid territorial limitation. This outcome 
would be consistent with established notions of sovereignty. See supra note 170. 
Furthermore, this inquiry is distinguishable from an analysis of whether a court should exercise its 
enforcement jurisdiction. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 40 (1965). The latter analysis arises where the United States and another nation prescribe conflicting 
laws by which a person cannot simultaneously abide, and a U.S. court must decide whether U.S. 
interests justify enforcing the U.S. law, despite the competing interests of the foreign nation and the 
hardship such enforcement would cause for persons within each nation's jurisdiction. See id. This 
comment proposes, however, that U.S. interests should not factor into the act of state analysis, since 
the act of state analysis focuses on the reaction of the foreign state. See supra notes 166-67 and 
accompanying text. Moreover, the question of whether a court should exercise jurisdiction arises only 
after a court determines that the act of state doctrine does not preclude subject matter jurisdiction. 
See Mannington MiIls, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1294 (3d Cir. 1979). It focuses on not 
only U.S. interests in exercising enforcement jurisdiction, but also on the enforceability of any judg-
ment. See id. at 1297-98. 
Two recent commentaries on the Allied Bank decisions have nevertheless merged the separate 
analyses. One proposes that, as a prerequisite to analyzing the separation of powers concerns under-
lying the act of state doctrine, a U.S. court must determine that the United States has exclusive 
jurisdiction over disputed property. See Note, Resolution of Act of State Disputes, supra note 25, at 929. 
The other asserts that for act of state purposes adjudicating a claim does not risk affronting a foreign 
sovereign if a U.S. court is able to grant enforceable relief. See Frumkin, supra note 25, at 470, 493. 
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undermine international comity in general. l87 The second inquiry recognizes 
the competence of the executive branch in areas in which it has formulated 
clear foreign policies. 188 Furthermore, it is distinguished from a comity analysis. 
Whereas a comity analysis evaluates whether a foreign state's acts in themselves 
are consistent with U.S. law and policy,189 this second inquiry considers whether 
adjudication of a claim involving those acts would frustrate U.S. foreign policy. 
Under this proposed act of state analysis, preservation of a separation of powers 
in matters of foreign policy would require application of the act of state doctrine 
upon an affirmative answer to either inquiry.190 
3. An Example Applying the Proposed Test 
Assuming arguendo that the court of appeals had to determine the applicability 
of the act of state doctrine to Allied Bank's claim, the primary factors for analysis 
in the first inquiry of the proposed approach would have evinced that adjudi-
cation of the claim would not so affront Costa Rica as to implicate the act of 
state doctrine. As a general rule, the location of property remains determinative 
as to whether Costa Rica had complete dominion over the debt. 191 Following 
the reasoning in Libra Bank, recognizing that jurisdiction over a debtor does not 
187 This inquiry does not constitute a choice-of-law analysis. For example, the choice-of-law analysis 
adopted in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICTS §§ 6, 188 (1971) applies the law of the state with 
the "most significant relationship" to the particular issue involved, which is identified by evaluating 
the policies and contacts with the states that could supply the controlling law. In contrast, the proposed 
act of state inquiry has an asymmetrical focus, centering on only the expectations of the acting foreign 
state, not the U.S. forum. 
188 The degree to which a court should defer to recommendations by the executive branch concern-
ing applicability of the act of state doctrine has been a controversial issue. An exception to the act of 
state doctrine, according complete deference to U.S. State Department suggestions, originated in 
Bernstein v. N. V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche, 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954). In First National City 
Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 756, 768 (1972), a three-justice plurality endorsed the 
"Bernstein exception". The remaining six justices, two concurring separately in the judgment and four 
dissenting, unequivocally rejected the Bernstein exception. See id. at 770-77. This latter view holds the 
act of state doctrine as a matter of judicial abstention and recognizes that a policy of complete deference 
would violate the separation of powers notion, which the act of state doctrine is intended to preserve, 
by eliminating an independent judiciary. Delson, The Act of State Doctrine-Judicial Deference or Abstention?, 
66 AM. J. INT'L L. 82,93 (1972). 
189 See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
190 To give full effect to the separation of powers notion underlying the act of state doctrine, a court 
should not be able to balance the two inquiries and, thereby, in effect have oversight power concerning 
U.S. foreign policies which would militate against applying the act of state doctrine, despite a reasonable 
likelihood that adjudication would affront the foreign state involved. The Hickenlooper Amendment 
operates as an exception to this approach, since it may be applicable despite the risk of an affront to 
an expropriating state. For a discussion of the Hickenlooper Amendment, see supra note 142. This 
approach nonetheless recognizes that the act of state doctrine is in itself an exception to the consti-
tutional allocation of power to the judiciary. See Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 423. 
191 See Allied Bank III, 757 F.2d at 521; Libra Bank, 570 F. Supp. at 881-82,884. 
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determine the situs of a debt that has substantial incidents elsewhere, 192 the situs 
of the debt owed the syndicate could have been attributed to New York on the 
basis of the contacts, not the interests, involved. 193 The parties to the loan 
agreements consented to the jurisdiction of New York courts,194 the debts were 
payable in New York in U.S. currency, 195 and New York law most likely provided 
the governing law of the loan agreements. 196 As to whether denying extrater-
ritorial effect to Costa Rica's exchange controls would seriously impair Costa 
Rican interests in responding to the national economic crisis, the court could 
have considered whether Costa Rica had more established alternatives for ob-
taining debt relief. While Costa Rica's payments moratorium, despite its effect 
on commercial obligations, served a legitimate governmental function in at-
tempting to ameliorate national economic problems,197 the established process 
for debt restructuring relies on negotiated, cooperative settlements between 
debtor nations and their creditors,19B not forced restructuring as sought by 
Costa Rica. Furthermore, as to the effect that Costa Rica's acts would have on 
international comity, the court could have found that imposition of a unilateral 
payments moratorium would implicate the concern underlying the commercial 
act exception. 199 As this concern recognizes that affording a foreign sovereign 
192 See supra notes 96-99 and accompanying text. 
193 This conclusion concurs with the situs determination in Allied Bank III, as well as in Libra Bank. 
See Allied Bank III, 757 F.2d at 522; Libra Bank, 570 F. Supp. at 882. Cf Tigert, supra note 21, at 525 
(a foreign state should have no reasonable expectations that its law will "be given effect over perfor-
mance owed by their nationals in another state's territory under the express terms of contracts 
enforceable in the other state's courts"). One commentator has placed the debts in Costa Rica because 
Costa Rica had exclusive jurisdiction over the debtor banks. See Note, Resolution of Act of State Disputes, 
supra note 25, at 934-35. This rationale, however, fails to recognize that jurisdiction over the debtor 
is necessary for dominion over a debt, but in itself does not determine the situs of the debt. See supra 
note 96. 
194 Allied Bank III, 757 F.2d at 521. 
195Id. at 518-19. 
196 Although the loan agreements did not stipulate a governing law, one commentary has concluded 
that "the facts that the loan was denominated in dollars, payable in New York, partially negotiated in 
New York, and the debtors submitted to jurisdiction in New York are sufficient to justify the choice 
of New York law." Zaitzeff & KUIll, supra note 25, at 478 n. 135. This result reflects the "grouping of 
contacts" approach for determining the choice of a governing law. See supra note 161. 
197 Recent cases have recognized the sovereign function served by imposing exchange controls to 
combat balance of payments problems in the context of the international debt crisis. See Callejo v. 
Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 110 I, 1116 (5th Cir. 1985) ("The power to issue exchange control regulations 
is paradigmatically sovereign in nature"); Braka v. Bancomer, S.N.C., 762 F.2d 222. 225 (2d Cir. 1985) 
("action, taken by the Mexican government for the purpose of saving its national economy from the 
brink of monetary disaster" is an exercise of sovereign power). It is reasonable to presume that other 
means to effect a payments moratorium may also serve a sovereign function. See RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 198 (1965) ("Conduct attributable to a 
state and causing damage to an alien does not depart from the international standard of justice ... if 
it is reasonably necessary in order to control the value of the currency or to protect the foreign 
exchange resources of the state."). 
198 For a discussion of this debt resolution strategy, see supra note 132. 
199 For a discussion of the commercial act exception, see supra notes 75-79 and accompanying text. 
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unlimited power to alter commercial obligations would destabilize international 
financial and trade relations and thus disrupt comity,200 the court could have 
concluded that giving effect to a unilateral payments moratorium would un-
dermine international comity in general. As these factors would not have indi-
cated that Costa Rica has objectively reasonable expectations that its unilateral 
payments moratorium would have extraterritorial effect at the expense of sta-
bility in world finance and trade, a conclusion could have been drawn that 
adjudicating Allied Bank's default claim would not have affronted Costa Rica. 
Under the second inquiry of the proposed analysis, an examination of U.S. 
foreign policy would have found that adjudication would not have violated the 
separation of powers. The executive branch supports the resolution of debt 
servicing problems through cooperative efforts by debtor nations, creditor gov-
ernments, and commercial lenders.20' This strategy encourages continued fi-
nancing by commerciallenders202 and advocates voluntary, not mandatory, debt 
restructurings.203 Costa Rica's payments moratorium, however, was a unilateral 
attempt to restructure external debt, and, if given extraterritorial effect, would 
jeopardize essential new lending to debtor nations.204 Since Costa Rica's acts 
were contrary to the debt resolution strategy, adjudicating Allied Bank's claim 
would not have interfered with, but would have bolstered, U.S. foreign policy. 
This example suggests, therefore, that under the proposed two-part act of state 
200 See Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 703-04. In support of this concern, the Dunhill Court reasoned that 
refusal to resolve commercial claims against foreign states would result in injuries to private business-
men and to international commerce, results which restrictive sovereign immunity seeks to avoid. Id. 
at 703-04. 
201 See supra note 132. In October 1985, the U.S. government announced an initiative, known as the 
"Baker plan", to resolve the international debt crisis. The Baker plan is similar to the strategy endorsed 
by the United States at the time of Allied Bank [[I, which encouraged debtor nations to meet their debt 
servicing needs by implementing economic austerity programs designed to create trade surpluses and 
by obtaining short-term commercial financing. The Baker plan advocates fostering faster economic 
growth in developing countries through new long-term lending by commercial lenders and interna-
tional organizations including the World Bank and the IMF. It nonetheless contemplates that the 
effectiveness of new lending depends on undertaking by debtor nations of structural and policy 
changes aimed at reducing inflation, discouraging the outflow of capital, and promoting direct foreign 
investment and trade; and that the IMF will continue its coordinating, supervisory role in the debt 
resolution process. See generally Risk~ Medicine, Wall SI. J., November 19, 1985, at 1, col. 6; Showdown 
over Latin Debt, TIME, October 14, 1985, at 62-63; U.S. Proposal on World Debt Faces Hurdles, Wall SI. 
J., October 8, 1985, at 35, col. 1. 
202 See supra notes 132 and 201. 
203 See U.S. Amicus Brief, supra note 132, at 6. 
204 See Ebenroth & Teitz, supra note 25, at 251; Gold, Exchange Control, supra note 139, at 38. One 
commentator perceives that adjudication would interfere with U.S. foreign policy, since allowing "rogue 
banks", banks not consenting to a negotiated restructuring proposal, to sue would disrupt the coop-
eration essential to the rescheduling process. See Note, Resolution of Act of State Disputes, supra note 25, 
at 934. This argument fails to recognize that appropriate clauses in syndication loan agreements can 
limit minority dissenters' rights. See Tigert, supra note 21, at 521. Furthermore, in order to avoid debt 
restrunurings mandated by U.S. foreign policy even without a limitation on dissenters' rights, com-
mercial lenders could withdraw from new financing and cause a retrenchment in loans contrary to 
U.S. foreign policy aims. See Ebenroth & Teitz, supra note 25, at 251. 
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analysis, the act of state doctrine would be inapplicable III claims concerning 
debtor nations' unilateral debt restructurings. 
C. Comity Analysis 
1. Article VIII, Section 2(b) As Law 
Had the Allied Bank III court determined that Article VIII, Section 2(b) of 
the Fund Agreement should govern the extraterritorial effect of exchange 
controls under U.S. and internationallaw,205 it could have altogether avoided 
its comity analysis.206 Prior to adoption of the Fund Agreement, courts often 
refused to give extraterritorial effect to a foreign state's exchange controls on 
the basis that such regulations opposed the public policy of the forum. 207 With 
the adoption of the Fund Agreement, Article VIII, Section 2(b) has become 
part of the national law of member states,208 and, if applicable, mandates the 
members' recognition of foreign exchange controls maintained or imposed 
consistently with the Fund Agreement.209 Instead of being subordinate to the 
principle of comity, Article VIII, Section 2(b) provides a rule of decision itself.210 
205 See supra notes 30 and 69 and accompanying text. 
206 In Libra Bank, the district court did recognize that the defense based on Article VIII, Section 
2(b) "is actually distinct from the arguments based upon the act of state doctrine", which it had 
construed to incorporate a comity analysis. Libra Bank, 570 F. Supp. at 896 n.!. 
207 See Williams (1975), supra note 61, at 373-74. These results followed the established principle 
"that in the absence of treaty provisions to the contrary, courts will not entertain actions for enforce-
ment, either directly or indirectly, of penal, revenue or public laws of a foreign state or of a law 
founded upon an act of a foreign state." Id. at 373. Other cases in which courts have denied giving 
effect to a foreign state's exchange controls have been decided on choice-of-Iaw grounds. See Central 
Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. Siemens & Halske Aktiengesellschaft, 15 F. Supp. 927 (S.D.N.Y. 1936), 
afl'd, 84 F.2d 993 (2d Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 585 (1936); Zaitzeff & Kunz, supra note 25, at 
459-60. In a leading New York case, this view prevailed, but the court also concluded that Article 
VIII, Section 2(b) did not apply. See J. Zeevi & Sons, Ltd. v. Grindlays Bank (Uganda) Ltd., 37 N.Y.2d 
220, 333 N.E.2d 168 (1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 866 (1975). Presuming the applicability of Article 
VIII, Section 2(b), however, construing the provision as part of the substantive law of the forum 
eliminates the relevance of choice-of-Iaw principles. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text. 
208 See supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
209 See GOLD (1965), supra note 65, at 23-24; Gold, Exchange Control, supra note 139, at 39-40; 
Williams (1975), supra note 61, at 376; Note, United States Enforcement of Foreign Exchange Control Laws-
A Rule In Transition?, 10 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL'y 535, 539-40 (1978). U.S. courts have recognized 
that exchange controls imposed consistently with the Fund Agreement should be given effect on public 
policy grounds. See, e.g., Southwestern Shipping Corp. v. National City Bank, 6 N.Y.2d 454,463, 160 
N.E.2d 836, 841, 190 N.Y.S.2d 352, 359 (1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 895 (1959); Perutz v. Bohemian 
Discount Bank In Liquidation, 304 N.¥. 533,537, 110 N.E.2d 6, 7-8 (1953). See also Menendez v. 
Saks & Co., 485 F.2d 1355, 1366-67 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Alfred Dunhill of 
London, Inc., 425 U.S. 682 (1976). In Menendez, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals stated that one 
nation will not enforce the revenue laws, including exchange controls, of another nation, unless an 
agreement between the nations prescribes enforcement; and then recognized that Article VIII of the 
Fund Agreement "evidenced a commitment on the part of the signatory nations to enforce each other's 
exchange controls as a matter of international cooperation." Menendez, 485 F.2d at 1366. 
210 See Ebenroth & Teitz, supra note 25, at 247. 
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2. Article VIII, Section 2(b) As Public Policy 
As a matter of construction, the Allied Bank III court properly examined U.S. 
foreign policy in its comity analysis. 211 To ascertain whether giving extraterri-
torial effect to a foreign state's acts would unduly burden the interests of U.S. 
nationals,212 comity analysis considers whether foreign acts are consistent with 
"the policy and law of the United States".213 This analysis examines the forum's 
public policy.214 Two U.S. Supreme Court decisions, United States v. Belmont215 
and United States v. Pink,216 suggest that for comity purposes public policy en-
compasses foreign policy. First, in both cases the Court held that international 
compacts or agreements entered into by the executive branch, as well as treaties 
approved by the U.S. Senate, are determinative of U.S. public policy.217 Second, 
both decisions infer that public policy demands state action consistent with 
foreign policy conducted by the political branches.218 The policy underlying the 
principle of comity, which is to protect U.S. interests, is consistent with this 
inference. As U.S. law, domestic policy, and foreign policy in total preserve and 
promote the interests of U.S. nationals, restricting comity analysis to an evalu-
ation of only U.S. law and domestic policy, excluding foreign policy, could make 
U.S. interests vulnerable to foreign acts that disadvantage the United States and 
leave persons protected by U.S. law without legal recourse.219 In Allied Bank III, 
211 See supra notes 130-32 and accompanying text. 
212 See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
213 See, e.g., United Bank Ltd. v. Cosmic Int'l Corp., 542 F.2d 868, 872 (2d Cir. 1976); Republic of 
Iraq v. First Nat'l City Bank, 353 F.2d 47, 51 (2d Cir. 19(5), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1027 (1966). 
214 See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
215 301 U.S. 324 (1937). 
216 315 U.S. 203 (1942). 
217 Pink, 315 U.S. at 230-31: Belmont, 301 U.S. at 331. Both cases involved the extraterritorial effect 
of a 1918 decree by which the Soviet government nationalized and appropriated Russian corporations' 
property wherever situated. Consequently, this issue called for determining the effect of the 1933 
Litvinov Assignment, by which the Soviet government released and assigned to the United States all 
amounts due to the Soviet government from U.S. nationals, including properties confiscated pursuant 
to the 1918 decree. 
21S See Pink, 315 U.S. at 233-34; Belmont, 301 U.S. at 331-32. In Pink, the Court stated 
No State can rewrite our foreign policy to conform to its own domestic policies. Power over 
external affairs is not shared by the States; it is vested in the national government exclusively. 
It need not be so exercised as to conform to state laws or state policies, whether they be 
expressed in constitutions, statutes, or judicial decrees. 
Pmk, 315 U.S. at 233. 
219 One commentary advocates limiting the comity analysis to U.S. law and domestic policy, on the 
ground that a comity analysis hinged on foreign policy would discriminate against unfriendly nations. 
See Zaitzeff & KUIlZ, supra note 25, at 477. To avoid such anomolous results, courts could consider 
foreign policy amounting to legal policy rather than strictly political policy. Concerning English law, 
for example, one author states that public policy, which does not include political policy, refers to an 
"indefinite concept" relating to matters regarded by the government "as clearly of fundamental concern 
to the state and society at large." GRAVESON, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 570 (5th ed. 1965). Such a 
distinction would be consistent with Pink and Belmont insofar as those cases concerned agreements 
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therefore, the court of appeals properly evaluated Costa Rica's acts in light of 
the U.S. debt crisis strategy since that strategy comprises an informal multilateral 
accord to which the United States is a party.220 More broadly, since U.S. foreign 
policy adopts that strategy, the court's comity analysis properly subsumed it 
within public policy so that the court would reach a consistent outcome. 
Nevertheless, the downside of reliance on foreign policy is that it politicizes 
the comity analysis. This politicization, as exemplified in Allied Bank III, could 
be deemed to evince the predisposition of U.S. courts toward preserving the 
commercial and financial power of the United States, even at the expense of 
the economic stability of a debtor nation.221 If debtor nations perceive such a 
proclivity in U.S. courts as perpetuating an oppressive U.S. hegemony over the 
debt resolution process, those nations could have inspiration to implement their 
own debt relief initiatives, including unilateral payments moratoria, despite legal 
repercussions in the United States: such initiatives would effectively undermine 
the U.S. debt crisis strategy.222 
The spectrum of characterizations of Costa Rica's payments moratorium man-
ifests the degrees to which the proclivity in favor of U.S. interests colored the 
reasoning of the courts. The Allied Bank III court branded the payments mor-
atorium an attempted repudiation of the debts owed.223 The Libra Bank court 
similarly labeled it an "effective confiscation" for comity purposes,224 but, for 
act of state purposes, recognized that it did not constitute a repudiation of the 
debt owed.22S The Allied Bank II court viewed it, not as a repudiation, but as a 
deferral of repayment of the loans extended by the syndicate.226 While the Allied 
Bank III and Libra Bank courts principally focused on the interference with the 
syndicate'S rights to debt payments caused by the moratorium, the Allied Bank 
executed as part of u.S. foreign policy which the U.S. Supreme Court considered as determinative of 
law as a treaty. See Pink. 315 U.S. at 222-23; Belmont, 301 U.S. at 331. 
220 The strategy was endorsed by seven Heads of State at the Williamsburg (Va.) Economic Summit 
meeting in 1983 and reaffirmed at the London Economic Summit in June 1984. INTERNATIONAL 
FINANCE: THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COUNCIL ON INTERNATIONAL AND FINANCIAL POLICIES ANNUAL 
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1984 36 (1985). 
221 See Ebenroth & Teitz, supra note 25, at 251-52. The deference to the certainty of contract under 
the comity analysis in Allied Bank III further could be interpreted to expose an unfair bias. Such 
absolute deference would permit private parties to immunize by contract their rights and obligations 
from the effect of any foreign law, even though the principle of comity embodies a recognition that 
a foreign law may supersede private contractual provisions when public policy so demands. See supra 
notes 49-52 and accompanying text. 
222 Developing countries, expressing dissatisfaction with efforts, including the Baker plan, to resolve 
the international debt problem, have proposed, but have not implemented, their own debt resolution 
plan and have threatened to withhold interest payments to commercial banks unless their plan receives 
consideration from their creditors. Wall St. j., December 23, 1985, at 19, col. I. 
223 Allied Bank Ifl, 757 F.2d at 522. 
224 Libra Bank, 570 F. Supp. at 882. 
225Id. at 880. 
226 Allied Bank II, 733 F.2d at 26. 
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II court considered the conduct effecting the moratorium.227 Under the former 
approach, the courts forced the moratorium to fit within the genus of an 
expropriation, despite the circumstances of its imposition, apparently accom-
modating their predisposition in favor of the creditor banks.228 In contrast, the 
Allied Bank II court did not obscure the character of Costa Rica's conduct, 
recognizing that the exchange controls were of a remedial nature.229 
Had the court of appeals in Allied Bank III simply focused on the medium by 
which Costa Rica effected its payments moratorium, it would have been directed 
through the comity analysis to determine the applicability of Article VIII, 
Section 2(b) of the Fund Agreement, which, as a codification of international 
law, should provide for an objective analysis. The application of Article VIII, 
Section 2(b) would have overcome the error committed by the Allied Bank II 
court in its evaluation of the remedial nature, rather than the form, of Costa 
Rica's conduct. 230 Although the court discerned that the exchange controls 
served a remedial function analogous to a bankruptcy procedure,23! it failed to 
recognize that unilateral debt restructuring by an insolvent debtor is inconsistent 
with U.S. bankruptcy laws. These laws, for example, provide for creditor par-
ticipation in the formulation of the debtor's reorganization plan232 and a neutral 
arbiter to approve and supervise its implementation.233 In contrast, Article VIII, 
227 See Ebenroth & Teitz, supra note 25, at 244-45. The Allied Bank I court, for act of state purposes, 
similarly focused on the imposition of exchange controls. See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying 
text. 
228 By characterizing the payments moratorium as an expropriation, the Libra Bank court made 
applicable Sabbatino and the progeny of cases limiting the act of state doctrine to expropriations 
accomplished within the territory of the acting foreign state. See Libra Bank, 570 F. Supp. at 877-80. 
See also Ebenroth & Teitz, supra note 25, at 244. The characterization by the Allied Bank III court was 
not essential to its comity analysis, but may nonetheless reflect the court's predisposition against the 
exchange controls. See Allied Bank III, 757 F.2d at 522. 
229 This recognition is consistent with the principle that a foreign state can take steps necessary to 
protect its exchange resources. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 198 (1965). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 199 (1965) ("Conduct attributable to a state and causing damage to an alien does not depart from 
the international standard of justice ... if it is reasonably necessary to conserve life or property in the 
case of disaster or other serious emergency."). 
230 See supra notes 113-17 and accompanying text. 
23J See supra notes 112-13 and accompanying text. 
232 The United States Bankruptcy Code provides for the appointment of a creditor committee which 
may assist an insolvent debtor in formulating a plan for reorganization of its debts. See U.S. Bankruptcy 
Code, 11 U.S.C. § §1102-03 (1982). See also U.S. Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § l109(b) (1982) (any 
party of interest has a right to address a court before a reorganization plan takes effect). 
233 The United States Bankruptcy Code provides for judicial supervision to ensure fair treatment of 
creditors. See U.S. Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.c. § 943 (1982) (a court must approve municipal reor-
ganization plans); 11 U.S.C. § 943(b)(6) (1982) (municipal reorganization plan must be in the best 
interests of creditors and be feasible); 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(4) (1982) (reorganization plans must provide 
for equal treatment of claims and among classes of creditors); 11 U.S.c. § §1128-29 (1982) (a court 
must confirm any reorganization plan). 
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Section 2(b) specifically addresses the legitimacy of exchange controls in member 
states,234 and its operation would afford a debtor state a reprieve analogous to 
a stay of collection actions available under U.S. bankruptcy law.235 Although 
U.S. foreign policy does not expressly endorse Article VIII, Section 2(b),236 its 
applicability would, nonetheless, be consistent with the U.S. debt resolution 
strategy. Since this strategy supports an IMF equipped to oversee a debtor 
nation's debt resolution efforts,237 the court of appeals could have inferred that 
U.S. foreign policy endorses the Fund Agreement, including Article VIII, Sec-
tion 2(b), from which the IMF derives its authority. Had the court properly 
focused on the legitimacy of exchange controls as remedial devices under Article 
VIII, Section 2(b), its decision could have clarified that Article VIII, Section 
2(b), independent of the principle of comity, ultimately should determine the 
extraterritorial enforcement of exchange controls. 
D. Applicability of Article VIII, Section 2(b) of the Fund Agreement 
The court of appeals in Allied Bank III, had it chose to determine the appli-
cability of Article VIII, Section 2(b) of the Fund Agreement, could have reev-
aluated the provision'S scope and effect under established principles of treaty 
interpretation. 238 A treaty, whether construed strictly or liberally, should always 
The Allied Bank II court's reliance on the Canadian Southern decision was similarly misplaced. For a 
discussion of the court's analysis, see supra notes 109-12 and accompanying text. In Canadian Southern, 
a majority of bondholders had approved the reorganization plan before its passage by the Canadian 
Parliament. 109 U.S. at 535. Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court's recognition of the act passed by the 
Canadian Parliament accepted that Canada properly exercised its right to regulate the internal legal 
relations of the corporation the existence of which derived from its laws. See id. at 537. See aL50 Second 
Russian Insurance Co. v. Miller, 268 U.S. 552, 560 (1925) (limiting Canadian Southern to signify that 
"the legal relations of the members of a corporation and to each other must be regulated and controlled 
by the jurisdiction in which the corporation is organized"). The Costa Rican exchange controls did 
not directly regulate the internal affairs of Costa Rican corporations, but only prevented Costa Rican 
nationals from obtaining foreign exchange to meet external debt payment obligations. See supra notes 
14-16 and accompanying text. 
234 For the manner in which the court should have construed Article VIII, Section 2(b), see infra 
notes 238-82 and accompanying text. 
235 The United States Bankruptcy Code provides for an automatic stay of all types of collection 
proceedings against a debtor upon the commencement of any voluntary or involuntary bankruptcy 
case. U.S. Bankruptcy Code, II U.S.C. § 362 (1982). 
236 The amicus brief filed by the U.S. government in the rehearing of Allied Bank II did not refer to 
Article VIII, Section 2(b). For a statement of the U.S. debt resolution strategy, see supra note 132. 
237 See supra notes 132 and 201. 
238 There are various methods by which Article VIII, Section 2(b) can be interpreted. One com-
mentator remarks that, to interpret the Article, 
one must take into account its wording; its context within the IMF Agreement; its negotiating 
history; its formal interpretation by the Fund; other IMF actions respecting the subsection; 
the extensive practice under it, including the many national court decisions in its 40-year 
history; and the rich scholarly commentary regarding its scope and analyzing decisions ap-
plying it. 
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be interpreted to effectuate its manifest purposes.239 When a treaty is amenable 
to two conflicting interpretations, whereby one restricts and the other expands 
the rights that may be claimed under it, the liberal construction is preferred.240 
Consistent with a liberal construction, a treaty's applicability should conform to 
changing circumstances, rather than be restricted by its literal terms.241 A con-
sideration of Article VIII, Section 2(b) in light of these principles supports a 
liberal construction of its scope and effect,242 abandoning the restrictive view 
preferred in Libra Bank.243 Furthermore, a liberal construction would effectuate 
the purposes of the Fund Agreement244 and conform the provision's meaning 
EDWARDS, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY COLLABORATION 477-78 (1985). In general, courts have tended 
to support interpretations of Article VIII, Section 2(b) without policy justification. See GOLD, THE 
FUND AGREEMENT IN THE COURTS: VOLUME II 5-6 (1982) rhereinafter cited as GOLD, VOLUME II]. 
Commentators, in general, give broader reading to the provision by focusing on its intent, legislative 
history, literal terms and correlation with the Fund Agreement. See, e.g., MANN, supra note 67, at 383-
91; Williams (1975), supra note 61, at 322-32. 
239 See, e.g., Baccardi Corp. v. Domenesch, 311 U.S. 150, 163 (1940); Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 
U.S. 276, 293-94 (1933); Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 922 (1977). 
See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 147(b) (1965) (courts 
should interpret international agreements to effect their stated purposes). 
240 See, e.g., Baccardi Corp. v. Domenesch, 311 U.S. 150,163 (1940); United States v. A. L. Burbank 
& Co., Ltd., 525 F.2d 9, 14 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 934 (1976); Maschinenfabrik Kern, 
A.G. v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 232, 236 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
241 See, e.g., Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d 1079, 1088 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 922 (1977); Day 
v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 528 F.2d 31, 35 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 890 (1975); Eck v. 
United Arab Airlines, Inc., 360 F.2d 804, 812 (2d Cir. 1966). In Day, the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals stated: 
Those called upon to construe a treaty should ... strive to "give the specific words of a treaty 
a meaning consistent with the genuine shared expectations of the contracting parties" .... 
These expectations can, of course, change over time. Conditions and new methods may arise 
not present at the precise moment of drafting. For a court to view a treaty as frozen in the 
year of its creation is scarcely more justifiable than to regard the Constitutional clock as 
forever stopped in 1787. 
Day, 528 F.2d at 35. In Ech, the court stated that the inquiry to discern and to articulate a treaty 
provision's purpose should not be limited to the provision's literal terms, as the terms may not reflect 
the provision's purpose as conformed to changed conditions since its adoption. Ech, 360 F.2d at 812. 
The court stated: 
It would be inconsistent with the "wise counsel to reject the tyranny of the literalness," ... if 
the court ... did not seek to interpret the provision so as to effectuate its purpose, even if 
this requires departing from in some measure from the letter and reading of the language 
in a practical rather than literal fashion. 
!d. 
242 See infra notes 260-70 and accompanying text. 
243 This preference is evident in the court's first two alternative views of Article VIII, Section 2(b). 
See supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text. 
244 Article I of the Fund Agreement states the purposes of the Fund Agreement: 
(i) To promote international monetary cooperation through a permanent institution which 
provides the machinery for consultation and collaboration on international monetary prob-
lems. 
(ii) To facilitate the expansion and balanced growth of international trade, and to contribute 
thereby to the promotion and maintenance of high levels of employment and real income 
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to the IMF's supervisory, coordinating role in the debt resolution process.245 
Had the court of appeals adopted such an interpretation, it would have resolved 
the ambivalence of the Libra Bank court's construction of Article VIII, Section 
2(b),246 thereby reducing the uncertainty as to the effect of exchange controls 
on international financial transactions.247 
The applicability of Article VIII, Section 2(b) primarily depends on which 
contracts come within its purview and the effect of exchange controls imposed 
after the formation of a valid executory contract. Restricting the term "exchange 
contracts" to contracts for the actual exchange of currencies,248 the Libra Bank 
court concluded that to define international loans as exchange contracts "does 
violence to the text of the section."249 In contrast, many commentators liberally 
and to the development of the productive resources of all members as primary objectives of 
economic policy. 
(iii) To promote exchange stability, to maintain orderly exchange arrangements among 
members, and to avoid competitive exchange depreciation. 
(iv) To assist in the establishment of a multilateral system of payments in respect of current 
transactions between members and in the elimination of foreign exchange restrictions which 
hamper the growth of world trade. 
(v) To give confidence to members by making the general resources of the Fund temporarily 
available to them under adequate safeguards. thus providing them with opportunity to correct 
maladjustments in their balance of payments without resorting to measures destructive of 
national or international prosperity. 
(vi) In accordance with the above, to shorten the duration and lessen the degree of dise-
quilibrium in the international balances of payments of members. 
FUND AGREEMENT, supra note 30, Art. 1. 
245 The IMF plays a key role in the debt resolution process. See supra notes 132 and 197. Generally, 
the IMF serves three functions in this process: it assists in formulating debtor nation's economic 
adjustment programs the implementation of which is a condition to receiving IMF financing; it provides 
financing to debtor nations with balance of payments difficulties and, by threatening not to provide 
financing without cooperation by commercial banks, persuades commercial banks to provide new 
external financing. See Hudes, supra note 118, at 563; Robichek, supra note 30. at 146. See also Saugen, 
Managed Lending: An Assessment of the Current Strategy Toward WC Debt, 17 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL'y 
533,534-36 (1985). 
246 See supra notes 103-06 and accompanying text. 
247 The IMF could resolve the questions concerning Article VIII, Section 2(b): the Executive Board 
of the IMF has the authority to settle any question of interpretation of the Fund Agreement arising 
between members. FUND AGREEMENT, supra note 30, Art. XXIX(a). One commentator states that it is 
generally held that interpretative decisions of the IMF are binding on the courts and administrative 
bodies of members. EDWARDS, supra note 238, at 37. Whether IMF interpretative decisions are binding 
or merely persuasive authority, however, is a matter that is much more controversial than the author 
perceives. See, e.g., Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d lIOI, 1119 n.26 (5th Cir. 1985) (although not 
determining whether IMF interpretations are binding on signatory nations, the court employed an 
IMF interpretation "merely as persuasive rather than binding authority"); Braka v. Bancomer, S.A., 
589 F. Supp. 1465, 1473 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), afl'd, 762 F.2d 222 (2d Cir. 1985) (citing IMF interpretation 
as to matter of fact, but not applying as the rule of decision the provision of the Fund Agreement to 
which the interpretation pertained); Banco do Brasil, S.A. v. A. C. Israel Commodity Co., 12 N.Y.2d 
371,376, 190 N.E.2d 235, 236-37, 239 N.Y.S.2d 872, 874 (1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 906 (1964) 
(using IMF interpretation to support the court's construction of Article VIII, Section 2(b)); Williams 
(1975), supra note 61, at 329-30. 
248 See Libra Bank, 570 F. Supp. at 897-900. 
249 [d. at 899. Accord, J. Zeevi & Sons, Ltd.v. Grindlays Bank (Uganda), Ltd., 37 N.Y.2d 220, 229, 
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construe exchange contracts as contracts affecting the balance of payments of 
the member whose currency is involved.250 While one leading commentator 
maintains that a member's currency is involved if its balance of payments is in 
any way affected,251 other commentators construe currency as meaning foreign 
exchange and argue that a currency is involved if the performance of a contract 
necessarily contemplates an increase in, or depletion of, the member's foreign 
exchange reserves.252 Under either liberal construction on this point, interna-
tional loan agreements payable in the United States in U.S. currency would 
come within the scope of Article VIII, Section 2(b).253 Yet, even if loan agree-
333 N.E.2d 168, 174,371 N.Y.S.2d 892, 900 (1975), cert. denied, 423 V.S. 866 (1975); Banco do Brasil, 
S.A. v. A. C. Israel Commodity Co., 12 N.Y.2d 371, 376, 190 N.E.2d 235, 236, 239 N.Y.S.2d 872, 874 
(1963), cert. denied, 376 V.S. 906 (1964). See also Nussbaum, Exchange Control and the International 
Monetary Fund, 59 YALE L.J. 421, 426 (1950) ("exchange contracts" should be limited to "transactions 
which have as their immediate object 'exchange', that is, international media of payment"). 
250 See, e.g., GOLD, VOLUME II, supra note 238, at 425; MANN, supra note 67, at 384-91; Williams 
(1975), supra note 51, at 321; Meyer, Recognition of Exchange Controls After the International Monetary 
Fund Agreement, 62 YALE L.J. 867, 868 (1953). Generally, European courts have endorsed a broad view 
of the meaning of exchange contracts. See Williams, Foreign Exchange Control Regulation and the New 
York Court of Appeals: J. Zeevi & Sons, Ltd. v. Grindlays Bank (Uganda), Ltd., 9 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 239, 
246 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Williams (1976)]. For recent comparative studies of Article VIII, 
Section 2(b), see Krasnostein, The Use of Multi-Currency and Multi-International Jurisdiction Stability 
Agreements Under Article VIII, Section 2(b) of the International Monetary Fund Articles of Agreement, 12 SYR. 
J. INT'L L. & COM. 15 (1985); Note, The Unenforceability of International Contracts Violating Foreign 
Exchange Regulations: Article VIII, Section 2(b) of the International Monetary Fund Agreement, 25 VA. J. INT'L 
L. 967 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Note, Unenforceability]. 
251 Gold, The Fund Agreement in the Courts-XIX, 31 IMF STAFF PAPERS 179, 192 (1984). Gold states 
that confusion concerning the scope of the Article "would not arise if 'exchange contracts' were 
understood to be contracts that affect the balance of payments of a country while the words 'involve 
the currency' point to the country whose balance of payments, and therefore, its currency, is affected." 
Id. 
252 See, e.g., EDWARDS, supra note 238, at 488; MANN, supra note 65, at 391-92; Williams (1975), supra 
note 61, at 349. Gold earlier maintained this view and focused on whether a contract affected, in an 
economic sense, a member's exchange resources. See GOLD (1965), supra note 67, at 25. Williams holds 
that a member's currency is involved when either the contract is entered into by a resident of the 
member or the contract deals with assets located within the member's territory; but this formulation 
presents the problem of locating the situs of a debt. See Williams (1975), supra note 61, at 349-50. 
Mann provides a more specific, although more limited, position, stating that "the involvement of the 
currency must ... be due to the particular exchange contract in issue." MANN, supra note 65, at 392. 
Edwards provides a restrictive reading, focusing on a member's exchange resources but not inter-
preting currency in a broad economic sense: he proposes that a currency is involved if either the 
contract in dispute contains an express or implied term providing for that currency to be the currency 
of payment, or the performance of the contract "in fact" makes necessary payment or transfer of that 
currency. EDWARDS, supra note 238, at 488. 
m See EDWARDS, supra note 238, at 489; Gold, supra note 251, at 192; Williams (1975), supra note 
61, at 338. Edwards recognizes that for purposes of the second prong of his proposed test, "whether 
it is necessary in fact to use a particular currency in order to perform the contract is to be determined 
on the facts of each case." EDWARDS, supra note 238, at 489. If a debtor has sufficient assets in the 
V nited States to satisfy a debt obligation, the Edwards test does not make clear whether the loan 
agreement underlying the debt would involve the currency of a member of which the debtor is a 
national. See id. 
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ments do constitute exchange contracts, a narrow view of Article VIII, Section 
2(b), as in Libra Bank,254 limits the provision's applicability to the original validity 
of a contract.255 In contrast, a liberal construction of the provision allows inter-
vening exchange controls to render valid obligations to perform under execu-
tory contracts unenforceable.256 This view suspends, but does not void, the 
obligations to perform.257 Therefore, although Libra Bank exemplifies judicial 
reluctance to expand the applicability of Article VIII, Section 2(b), the liberal 
interpretation of its scope and effect - both including international loan agree-
ments within the meaning of exchange contracts and allowing intervening ex-
change controls to suspend the performance of valid contracts - is supported 
as a matter of treaty interpretation.258 
A liberal construction would help to effectuate the objective of the Fund 
Agreement "[tJo shorten the duration and lessen the degree of disequilibrium 
in the international balance of payments of members". 259 Debtor nations' balance 
of payments problems, collectively accounting for the international debt crisis, 
while precipitated by factors which include explosive growth in international 
lending, persist because of, among other reasons, spiralling debt servicing bur-
dens. 26o Allowing a suspension of debt servicing through operation of Article 
VIII, Section 2(b) would provide debtor nations with a reprieve, under the 
Fund Agreement, from the burden that may have necessitated the call for 
emergency debt relief.261 A payments moratorium given effect under Article 
254 Libra Bank, 570 F. Supp. at 900. 
255 This view. which is supported by the use of the present tense in the provision, regards the 
purpose of Article VIII, Section 2(b) as preventing enforcement of contracts that were intended at 
the time of their formation to evade or avoid a member's exchange controls. MANN, supra note 67, at 
377-78. This view, however, renders irrelevant all events subsequent to the formation of an executory 
contract, and consequently, it would permit enforcement of the exchange controls of a nation that has 
withdrawn from the IMF, even though the Fund Agreement is intended to benefit only IMF members. 
Gold, supra note 251, at 193. 
256 See Gold, supra note 251, at 193; Williams (1975), supra note 61, at 364-67; Meyer, supra note 
250, at 893. Two recent cases infer recognition of not only intervening exchange controls, but also a 
broad interpretation of the meaning of exchange contracts. See Braka v. Bancomer, S.A., 589 F. Supp. 
1465. 1473 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), a/I'd, 762 F.2d 222 (2d Cir. 1985) (the possibility that certificates of deposit 
may be rendered unenforceable by later Mexican exchange controls indicated that the U.S. creditors 
"accepted the risks attending foreign investments"); Weston Banking Corp. v. Turkiye Garanti Bankasi, 
57 N.Y.2d 315, 326, 442 N.E.2d 1195, 1200,456 N.Y.S.2d 684, 689 (1982) (court would have consid-
ered the applicability of Article VIII, Section 2(b) had Turkish exchange controls suspended all 
external debt payments in foreign exchange, even though the controls were enacted after the parties 
executed the promissory notes in dispute). 
257 See GOLD (1965), supra note 67, at 23; Williams (1975), supra note 61, at 364. For the IMF 
interpretation concerning the unenforceability of contracts under Article VUl, Section 2(b), see supra 
note 66 and accompanying text. 
258 See supra note 8. 
259 FUND AGREEMENT, supra note 30, art. I(vi). 
260 See supra note 8. 
261 Gold, supra note 251, at 193. See Williams (1975), supra note 61, at 366-68. 
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VIII, Section 2(b) would thereby allow a debtor nation to restrict destabilizing 
outflows of capital,262 and afford the debtor nation an opportunity to eradicate 
economic and structural problems contributing to its payments imbalances. 263 
Moreover, a liberal construction of Article VIII, Section 2(b) would be con-
sistent with the objective "[t]o promote international monetary cooperation" 
through the auspices of the IMF and the Fund Agreement.264 Article VIII, 
Section 2 of the Fund Agreement265 establishes a legal regime, focused on the 
supervisory role of the IMF, for determining the legitimacy of foreign exchange 
controls.266 Article VIII, Section 2(b) provides for the extraterritorial enforce-
ment of exchange controls imposed consistently with the Fund Agreement.267 
The requirement of consistency relates back to Article VIII, Section 2(a), which 
262 Retention of capital would protect a member's exchange resources. See Williams (1975), supra 
note 61, at 366. It could also ameliorate the member's balance of payments difficulties insomuch as 
capital outflows, usually encouraged by overvaluation of the debtor nation's currency and by inflation-
ary pressures in the debtor nation's economy, exacerbate payments imbalances. See IMF (1983), supra 
note 8, at 7. For a definition of balance of payments, see supra note 30. 
263 The need for such a grace period is recognized by the IMF in its policy statement regarding the 
imposition of exchange controls for balance of payments purposes: 
If members, for balance of payments reasons, propose to maintain or introduce measures 
which require approval under Article VIII, the Fund will grant approval only where it is 
satisfied that the measures are necessary and that their use will be temporary while the member 
is seeking to eliminate the need for them. (Emphasis added) 
International Monetary Fund, Decision No. 1034-(60/27), reprinted in SELECTED DECISIONS, supra note 
63, at 241. Recognition of the need for a grace period during which a debtor nation can implement 
structural and policy changes essential to restoring sustained debt servicing capability also underlies 
the concept of debt restructuring. See Meissner, supra note 118, at 138-39. Furthermore, affording a 
debtor nation to suspend debt obligations with the support of Article VIII, Section 2(b) would ensure 
temporary debt relief through a reprieve analogous to a stay of collection proceedings under U.S. 
bankruptcy law, rather than forcing the debtor nation to rely on voluntary debt restructurings. For a 
discussion of the stay under U.S. bankruptcy law, see supra note 235 and accompanying text. 
264 FUND AGREEMENT, supra note 30, art. I(i). Commentators supporting a liberal construction of 
Article VIII, Section 2(b) cite the promotion of international monetary cooperation as the paramount 
purpose which an interpretation of the provision should effectuate. See MANN, supra note 67, at 384; 
Williams (1976), supra note 250, at 246. In contrast, a recent commentator, advocating retaining a 
restrictive interpretation of Article VIII, Section 2(b) to promote "relative certainty of the interpre-
tation of contracts", reasons that such "certainty of interpretation can preserve New York's position 
as the [world's] leading financial center." Note, Unenforceability, supra note 250, at 998-99. This 
reasoning only undermines the goal of international monetary cooperation as it tends to advance U.S. 
financial hegemony at the expense of legitimate economic concerns of other member nations. 
265 As of January 1984, approximately three-fifths of the IMF's membership had not accepted all 
the obligations under Article VIII, but instead, relied on the "transitional arrangements" of Article 
XIV of the Fund Agreement, which allow a member "to maintain and adapt to changing circumstances 
the restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions that were in effect 
on the date on which it became a member." EDWARDS, supra note 238, at 20. The IMF interpretation 
of Article VIII, Section 2(b) states, however, that Article VIII, Section 2(b) binds all members, including 
those nations relying upon the Article XIV transitional arrangements. [d. at 478. For a discussion of 
the IMF interpretation of Article VIII, Section 2(b), see supra notes 63-68 and accompanying text. 
266 For an analysis of Article VIII, Section 2 of the Fund Agreement, see generally EDWARDS, supra 
note 238, at 389-422. 
267 See supra text accompanying note 30. 
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prohibits members from imposing, without IMF approval, "restrictions on the 
making of payments and transfers for current international transactions."268 As 
defined in the Fund Agreement, payments for current international transactions 
include payments of interest on loans and moderate amounts for the amorti-
zation of loan principaP69 The regime of Article VIII, Section 2, therefore, 
contemplates that the IMF must approve a member's moratorium on payments 
of interest or moderate amounts of amortization effected through exchange 
controls in order for the moratorium to have extraterritorial effect.270 
268 FUND AGREEMENT, supra note 30. art. VIII. § 2(a). This provision proscribes government action 
that may delay. limit, or prevent any of the acting country's residents from obtaining a foreign currency 
issued by an IMF member that the resident needs for making payments to nonresidents in settlement 
of current international transactions. International Monetary Fund, Decision No. 3153-(70/95), re-
printed in SELECTED DECISIONS, supra note 63, at 243. See EDWARDS, supra note 238, at 391. Similarly, 
the IMF has defined a "restriction" on current international transactions as any "direct governmental 
limitation on the availability or use of exchange as such." International Monetary Fund, Decision No. 
1034-(60/27), reprinted in SELECTED DECISIONS, supra note 63, at 241. The definition of "payments for 
current transactions" includes: 
(l) all payments due in connection with foreign trade, other current business, including 
services, and normal short-term banking and credit facilities; 
(2) payments due as interest on loans and as net income from other investments; 
(3) payments of moderate amount for amortization of loans or for depreciation of direct 
investments; and 
(4) moderate remittances for family living expenses. 
FUND AGREEMENT, supra note 30, art. XXX(d). In contrast to the treatment of current transactions, 
members may impose, without IMFapproval, controls on international capital movements but only in 
a manner which does not restrict payments for current transactions and which does not "unduly delay 
transfers of funds in settlement of commitments." FUND AGREEMENT, supra note 30, art. VI, § 3. 
269 FUND AGREEMENT, supra note 30, art. XXX(d). Although economists often treat amortization of 
loans as a "capital" item, the regularity of amortization payments and the financial disruption which 
would result from their interruption justify treating them as current payments for exchange regulation 
purposes. EDWARDS, supra note 238, at 395 n.55. The determination of what constitutes a "moderate 
amount" of amortization, though, may require gleaning standards from local experience and com-
mercial practice. See Santucci, Sovereign Debt Resolution Through The International Monetary Fund: An 
Alternative to the Allied Bank Decision, 14 DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'y I, 17 (1985). 
270 A controversy exists as to whether the IMF has exclusive authority to determine consistency for 
purposes of Article VIII, Section 2(b). Edwards states that the IMF has exclusive power derived from 
Article XXIX of the Fund Agreement, which provides that any question of interpretation of the 
provisions of the Fund Agreement arising between members must be submitted to the IMF for a 
decision. EDWARDS, supra note 238, at 481-82. Williams maintains, however, that a court may inde-
pendently make a consistency determination. Williams (1976), supra note 250, at 247-48. In support 
of the latter view, the Libra Bank court placed the burden of proof on the debtor banks claiming the 
Article VIII, Section 2(b) defense to show that Costa Rica's exchange controls were either approved 
by the IMF or only affecting capital transactions. See Libra Bank, 570 F. Supp. at 901-02. In contrast, 
in Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101, 1118-20 (5th Cir. 1985), the Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals, after concluding that the ambiguous differentiation between current and capital transactions 
in the Fund Agreement precluded it from making its own consistency determination, relied on as 
persuasive authority the IMF's consistency determination. In support of this moderate position, Gold 
suggests that in order to eliminate the risk of denying the effect of legitimate exchange controls simply 
because a party failed to meet the burden of proof, courts as a matter of prudence should rely on the 
IMF's consistency determination. See Gold, supra note 251, at 200. 
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In addition, a liberal construction of Article VIII, Section 2(b) would conform 
to the role performed by the IMF in the debt resolution process.271 Through 
the Fund Agreement, the IMF is charged with the responsibility of monitoring 
the international monetary system to ensure its orderly operation.272 Accord-
ingly, the IMF works to eradicate monetary disequilibria without disrupting 
national or world economic growth and stability.273 In the context of the inter-
national debt crisis, the IMF carries out its responsibility by performing a pivotal 
role in resolving monetary disturbances in a cooperative and constructive man-
ner.274 Most significantly, the debt resolution process depends on the IMF to 
assist in formulating and overseeing the economic adjustments implemented by 
debtor nations having debt servicing difficulties.275 The IMF's authority and 
ability to act derive from the Fund Agreement.276 To restrict the scope and 
effect of the IMF's authority to regulate exchange controls as contemplated in 
Article VIII, Section 2(b) undermines the IMF's ability to foster international 
monetary stability through cooperation and development.277 Conversely, 
though, a liberal construction of Article VIII, Section 2(b) would enhance the 
IMF's ability to supervise all actions affecting the international monetary system 
while encouraging world economic growth and stability.278 
While a liberal construction of Article VIII, Section 2(b) would not eliminate 
the risk that a foreign state may impose a payments moratorium through 
exchange controls,279 it would contribute a measure of certainty to international 
271 For a discussion of the U.S. debt resolution process, see supra notes 132 and 201. 
272 FUND AGREEMENT, supra note 30, art. IV, § 3(a). 
273 See Silard, Exchange Controls and External Indebtedness: Are the Bretton Woods Concepts Still Workable? 
A Perspective From the International Monetary Fund, 7 Hous.]. INT'L L. 53, 69 (1985); Tseng, The Effects 
of Adjustment, FIN. & DEVEL., December 1984, at 4. 
27. See Silard, supra note 269, at 69. 
275 See supra notes 132 and 201. 
276 See Silard, supra note 273, at 69. 
277 See id. 
278 Many commentators propose that the most effective method for resolving the international debt 
crisis would be to create a formal mechanism for providing emergency debt relief and ordering the 
rights and duties of debtor nations and creditors in debt restructurings. See, e.g., Debevoise, Exchange 
Controls and External Indebtedness: A Model Proposal for A Deferral Mechanism Employing the Bretton Woods 
Concei,ts,7 HOus.]. INT'L L. 157, 162-68 (1985); Ebenroth & Teitz, supra note 25, at 255-56; Suratgar, 
The International Financial System and the Management of the International Debt Crisis, in DEFAULT AND 
RESCHEDULING, supra note 7, at 151, 155-59; Comment, supra note 8, at 135-40; Note, Procedural 
Guidelines for Renegotiating LDC Debt: An Analogy to Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Reform Act, 21 VA. 
]. INT'L L. 305 (1981). For a proposal of other proposed reforms, see generally Hudes, supra note 
118, at 567-69. 
279 The pricing of international loans, through a risk-premium in interest charges, could reflect the 
risk of any payments disruption due to a payments moratorium effective under Article VIII, Section 
2(b). The pricing of a loan is a function of the risk associated with repayment of the loan, and the 
contracting parties' expectations concerning how courts will respond to actions in default factor into 
an evaluation of risk. See Hoffman & Deming, The Role of the Courts in the Transnational Flow of Funds, 
17 N.Y.U.]. INT'L L. & POL'y 493,495 (1985). Although this pricing may seem paradoxically to 
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financial transactions which the scheme of Allied Bank III fails to deliver. In 
Allied Bank III the court of appeals stated that Costa Rica's exchange controls, 
while not excusing the obligations of the Costa Rican banks, could render the 
judgment against those banks unenforceable. 280 In essence, application of Ar-
ticle VIII, Section 2(b) would have obtained the same result in that valid debts 
would have been recognized, but would not have been enforced.281 Yet, in 
contrast to Allied Bank III, a liberal construction of Article VIII, Section 2(b) 
would protect against the enforcement of exchange controls contrary to the 
Fund Agreement, and would facilitate the integration of any payments mora-
torium effected through legitimate exchange controls into a cooperative plan 
coordinating the debt resolution efforts by the debtor nation and its creditors.282 
Therefore, had the court of appeals adopted a liberal construction of Article 
VIII, Section 2(b), an equivalent outcome could have ultimately been obtained, 
and confidence in the international monetary system would have been aug-
mented by affirming the direction of the IMF. 
V. CONCLUSION 
By failing to address the applicability of Article VIII, Section 2(b) of the Fund 
Agreement within its act of state and comity analyses, the Allied Bank III court 
not only risked denying extraterritorial effect to exchange controls which may 
have been legitimate under the Fund Agreement, but also perpetuated the 
uncertainty concerning the provision's scope and effect on international finan-
cial transactions. Despite Allied Bank III, Article VIII, Section 2(b) should be 
liberally reconstrued, consistent with established principles of treaty interpre-
tation, to effectuate the purposes of the Fund Agreement and to conform it to 
the IMF's role in the debt resolution process. A liberal construction recognizes 
that restricting the IMF's powers under the Fund Agreement undermines the 
ability of the IMF to eradicate disturbances in the international monetary system, 
while at the same time encourages national and world economic growth and 
stability. Although a liberal construction would not eliminate the risk that a 
foreign state could impose a payments moratorium through exchange controls, 
it would ensure that such a payments moratorium would provide only emer-
gency debt relief integrated, through the IMF, with all debt resolution efforts. 
increase a debtor nation's debt servicing burdens, by hypothesis the debtor nation's debt resolution 
efforts. overseen by the IMF, would ensure that only prudent new debt obligations be undertaken. 
280 Allied Bank III, 757 F.2d at 522. 
281 See supra notes 256-57 and accompanying text. 
282 To enhance the certainty of such integration, the privilege of being accorded extraterritorial 
effect of exchange controls could be contingent on the implementation by the debtor nation of an 
IMF-approved economic adjustment program and, thus, be treated as is the privilege of obtaining 
IMF financing. See Santucci, supra note 269, at 9-15. 
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The court of appeals' avoidance of Article VIII, Section 2(b) in Allied Bank 
III both resulted from, and lead into, a muddled act of state analysis and a 
misdirected comity analysis. Had the court recognized that Article VIII, Section 
2(b) supplants the act of state doctrine and the principle of comity, it could have 
avoided the appearance of a discriminatory, nationalistic judicial bias in its act 
of state and comity analyses. The court's act of state analysis, reflecting the lack 
of guidance from the U.S. Supreme Court concerning the proper act of state 
analysis, evinces the need to reformulate the test to determine how to allocate 
the decision-making power between the judicial and executive branches of the 
federal government. This comment proposes that the act of state analysis should 
consist of a two-part test, focusing on the effect that adjudication of a claim 
would have on comity and U.S. foreign policy. Under such an approach, the 
act of state doctrine would not preclude adjudication of claims arising from 
unilateral restructurings of debts located outside the acting foreign state and 
not effected through exchange controls. Notwithstanding the act of state anal-
ysis, the court of appeals' comity analysis disregarded that Costa Rica imposed 
its payments moratorium through exchange controls and assumed that the 
moratorium was akin to an expropriation, leading the court to conclude that it 
was contrary to the U.S. foreign policy against unilateral debt restructurings. 
Had the court recognized that Article VIII, Section 2(b) should determine the 
legitimacy of exchange controls and that Costa Rica's payments moratorium 
served only a remedial function, it could have, consistent with U.S. foreign 
policy, equipped the IMF with greater ability to respond to debt servicing crises 
and would have not risked denying extraterritorial effect to exchange controls 
that may have been legitimate under the Fund Agreement and U.S. law and 
policy. Thus, although Allied Bank III has been heralded as limiting risk in 
international financial transactions, the decision only confuses the proper treat-
ment of exchange controls under the act of state doctrine, the principle of 
comity, and Article VIII, Section 2(b) and impedes the ability of the IMF to 
oversee the resolution of the international debt crisis. 
Robert P. Coyne 
